Abstract: During the 1980s, a number of unusual financial crises occurred. In Chile, for example, the financial sector collapsed, leaving the government with responsibility for extensive foreign debts. In the United States, large numbers of government-insured savings and loans became insolvent - and the government picked up the tab. In Dallas, Texas, real estate prices and construction continued to boom even after vacancies had skyrocketed, and the suffered a dramatic collapse. Also in the United States, the junk bond market, which fueled the takeover wave, had a similar boom and bust. In this paper, we use simple theory and direct evidence to highlight a common thread that runs through these four episodes. The theory suggests that this common thread may be relevant to other cases in which countries took on excessive foreign debt, governments had to bail out insolvent financial institutions, real estate prices increased dramatically and then fell, or new financial markets experienced a boom and bust. We describe the evidence, however, only for the cases of financial crisis in Chile, the thrift crisis in the United States, Dallas real estate and thrifts, and junk bonds. Our theoretical analysis shows that an economic underground can come to life if firms have an incentive to go broke for profit at society's expense (to loot) instead of to go for broke (to gamble on success). Bankruptcy for profit will occur if poor accounting, lax regulation, or low penalties for abuse give owners an incentive to pay themselves more than their firms are worth and then default on their debt obligations.

所有者掠夺：以破产牟利的经济黑幕活动

Looting：The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit

乔治·阿克洛夫 保罗·罗默

近两年国内股票市场动荡不安，是否有房地产泡沫争论不休。阿克洛夫和罗默的这篇文章利用简单的理论模型和直接证据，分析了智利金融危机、美国储贷危机、美国达拉斯和得克萨斯房地产泡沫以及美国垃圾债券市场中的所有者掠夺行为，这一行为是如何发生，又是如何导致市场的崩溃。本文虽写于10多年前，但其所阐述的问题却与我们当前高度关注的问题有那么一些不谋而合。

—————————《比较》

非常感谢

谢谢楼主，强力支持免费资源