8 Business Cycles: Evidence, Theory, and Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Forecasting Recessions and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Frisch’s Theory of Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Samuelson’s Model of Interaction Between Multiplier and Acceleration 159
Hicks’s Model of Two Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
A Critique of Keynesian Models of Business Cycles . . . . . . . . . . 162
Real Business Cycles Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
A Simple Model of Real Business Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
A Bayesian Interpretation of Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
New Keynesian Models with Nominal and Real Rigidities . . . . . . . 169
Convergence in Macroeconomics: DSGE Models with New
Keynesian Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Business Cycles and Economic Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Economic Model as a Means of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
An Anti Empirical Trait Among Economists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
9 Money, Monetary Policy, and Monetarism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
The Quantity Theory of Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
The Money Supply Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
The Federal Funds Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
OpenMarketOperation andFOMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Targeting Money Supply vs. the Federal Funds Rate . . . . . . . . . . 189
Central Bank’s Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Central Bank’s Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
InflationTargeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
Monetarism Program for Monetary Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Rules vs.Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Time Inconsistency of Optimal Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
TheTermStructure of InterestRates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
The Market Segmentation Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
xii Contents
The Expectations Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
Liquidity Preference Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
10 Government Budget and Fiscal Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
An Overview of Revenues and Expenditures
of theUSGovernment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Government Budget Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
The Ricardian Equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
TheCrowdingOutEffect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
Taxes and Incentives to Work and Save . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Flat Tax and Negative Income Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
ConsumptionTax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
Political Economy of Budgets and Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
The Illusion of Populist Economic Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
11 The Reagan-Thatcher Revolution: The Age of Hayek and
Schumpeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Hayek’s Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
Schumpeter’s Theory of Business Cycles and Growth . . . . . . . . . 215
Supply Side Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
TheLafferCurve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
A Change of Emphasis from Stabilization to Growth . . . . . . . . . . 220
TheRamseyProblem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
The Overlapping Generations Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Endogenous Growth Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
In Search of the Elements of Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
TheReaganYears . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
The Great Moderation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
12 Macroeconomics of Globalized Economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
WorldTradeOrganization (WTO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
TheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement (NAFTA) . . . . . . . . . 235
The European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
Other Aspects of Globalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
The International Monetary System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
SovereignDebt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
Sovereign Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
International Economic Policy Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
13 The Financial and Economic Crisis of 2007–2009 . . . . . . . . . . 241
Enough Blame to Go Around . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
TheAmericanDreamofHomeownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
Subprime Mortgage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
TheHousingCrisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
The Function of Finance and Financial Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Assets,Risk, andDiversification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Long, Short, and Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Hedging, Arbitrage, and Speculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Financial Innovations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
Derivatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
Asset-Backed Securities, Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDOs), andCreditDefaultSwaps (CDSs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
Fraud in Financial Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
The Financial Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
TheStockMarket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
The Effects on the Real Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
Government Response to the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
Back totheFuture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265