英文文献：Incentive to reduce crop trait durability-减少作物性状耐久性的诱因
英文文献作者：Ambec, Stefan,Langinier, Corinne,Lemarie, Stephane
英文文献摘要：
Inbred line seed producers face competition from their own consumers: farmers who save part of their harvest can costly self-produce. To reduce this competition, seed producers can switch to non-durable hybrid seed production. In a two-period model, we investigate what is the impact of crop durability on self-production, pricing strategies and switching decision. We first study the pricing decisions and switching decisions of an inbred line seed monopoly. Then, we analyze how the monopoly's behavior is affected by the entry of a hybrid seed producer. We also examine how the introduction of royalties on farmers who self-produce improves efficiency. Our main finding is that, for some constellation of costs, an inbred line seed monopoly has an incentive to produce technologically dominated hybrid seed in order to extract more surplus from farmers. Along the same lines, an inbred line monopoly has an incentive to let a hybrid seed producer enters the market for discrimination purposes.

自交系种子生产者面临着来自自身消费者的竞争:节省了部分收成的农民可以自产，成本很高。为了减少这种竞争，种子生产者可以转向非耐久杂交种子生产。在一个两期模型中，我们研究了作物耐久性对自我生产、定价策略和转换决策的影响。首先研究了自交系种子垄断的定价决策和转换决策。然后，分析了杂交种子生产商进入市场对垄断行为的影响。我们还研究了对自产农民征收版税如何提高效率。我们的主要发现是，在某些成本集群中，自交系种子垄断企业有动机生产技术主导的杂交种子，以从农民那里榨取更多的剩余。同样，近交系的垄断者会出于歧视的目的让杂交种子生产者进入市场。