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Firm A is considering taking over firm T. It does not know firm T's value. It believes that it this value, when firm T is controlled by its own management , is at least $0 and at most $100, and assigns equal probability to each of the 101 dollar values in this range. Firm T will be worth 50% more under firm A's management than it is under its own management. Suppose that firm A bids y to take over firm T, and firm T is worth x ( under its own management), Then if T accepts A's offer , A's payoff is 2/3*x-y, and T's payoff is y; if T rejects A's offer, A's payoff is 0, and T's payoff is x. Model this situation as a Bayesian game in which firm A chooses how much to offer and firm T decides the lowest offer to accept. Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. Explain why the logic behind the equilibrium is called " adverse selection".

[此贴子已经被作者于2005-11-23 11:01:08编辑过]