1 论文标题： 保险业垄断寡头之间的保险审核竞争
2 作者信息：

Nicolas Boccard

吉罗那大学经济系

Patrick Legros

美国东北大学经济系

3 出处：Nicolas Boccard,Patrick Legros. Audit Competition in Insurance Oligopolies[J]. Front. Econ. China, 2017, 12(3): 371-399.

链接：

URL:

http://journal.hep.com.cn/fec/EN/10.3868/s060-006-017-0016-1 http://journal.hep.com.cn/fec/EN/Y2017/V12/I3/371

4 摘要

保险业垄断寡头之间的保险审核竞争

Nicolas Boccard

吉罗那大学经济系

Patrick Legros

美国东北大学经济系

摘要：我们提供了一个简单框架，分析竞争如何影响保险垄断寡头对保险审核结构的选择。当竞争加剧时，保险诈骗增加，但作为应对保险公司在审核质量的投入上服从U型分布。当保险业处于低层次竞争时，随着竞争加剧，审核质量上的投入将减少；但当保险业处于高层次竞争时，审核质量上的投入将增加。我们发现：只有当竞争适度时，保险公司能从合作审核机构那里受益；此时，寡头之间的合作将提高总体福利。我们还分析了合同创新对于保险行业绩效的影响。

Audit Competition in Insurance Oligopolies

Nicolas Boccard

Economics Department, Universitat de Girona

Patrick Legros

Economics Department, Northeastern University

Abstract: We provide a simple framework for analyzing how competition affects the choice of audit structures in an oligopolistic insurance industry. When the degree of competition increases, fraud increases but the response of the industry in terms of investmentin audit quality follows a U-shaped pattern. Following increases incompetition, the investment in audit quality will decrease if the industry is initially in a low competition regime while it will increase when the industry is in a high competition regime. We show that firms will benefit from forming ajoint audit agency only when the degree of competition is intermediate; in this case, cooperation might improve total welfare and we analyze the effects of contract innovation on the performance of the industry.