Course Requirements
[size=13.3333px]Class participation: the syllabus lists papers with star next to it. This indicates reading is required before class. You are expected to actively join the discussion of these papers in class.
[size=13.3333px]Problem sets: there are three problem sets for the class. 3. Final Exam: there will be a take-home exam

[size=13.3333px]Papers with * will be covered in class.

I. Market Structure and Two Stage Entry Games (Complete Set of Lecture Note)

Complete Information: Homogenous Firms (Oct 17.)

[size=13.3333px]· *Bresnahan, T.F., and P.C. Reiss, “Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets”, JPE, 1991, 99 (5)

[size=13.3333px]· *Berry and Reiss, "Empirical Models of Entry and Market Structure", Section 1-2, Handbook of Industrial Organization

[size=13.3333px]· *Campbell and Hopenhayn, "Market Size Matters", JIndE, 2005

[size=13.3333px]· #Sutton, "Market Structure: Theory and Evidence", Sections 2.1-2.4, Handbook of Industrial Organization

Complete Information: Heterogeneous Firms (Oct 22/24/29)

[size=13.3333px]· *Berry, S.T., “Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry”, Econometrica, 1992, 60 (4)

[size=13.3333px]· *Mazzeo, M.J., “Product Choice and Oligopoly Market Structure”, Rand, 2002, 33 (2)

[size=13.3333px]· *Jia, P., “What Happens When Walmart Comes to Town”, Econometrica, 2008

[size=13.3333px]· *Berry and Reiss, "Empirical Models of Entry and Market Structure", Section 3.1-3.2, Handbook of Industrial Organization

[size=13.3333px]· #Bresnahan, T.F., and P.C. Reiss, “Empirical Models of Discrete Games”, Journal of Econometrics, 1991

[size=13.3333px]· #Sutton, "Market Structure: Theory and Evidence", Sections 2.5, Handbook of Industrial Organization

[size=13.3333px]· *Ciliberto, F. and E. Tamer, “Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in the Airline Markets”, Econometrica

[size=13.3333px]Note: Federico Bugni gives a guest lecture of Partial Identification on Oct 31.

Incomplete Information (Deferred to Dynamic Game)

[size=13.3333px]· *Seim, K., “An Empirical Model of Firm Entry with Endogenous Product-Type Choices”, Rand, 2006, 37 (3)

[size=13.3333px]· #Sweeting, A., “The Strategic Timing of Radio Commercials: An Empirical Analysis Using Multiple Equilibria”, Rand, 2009

II. Bounds Based Estimation (Complete Set of Lecture Note)

[size=13.3333px]Moment Inequalities and Applications (Nov 5/7)

[size=13.3333px]· *Pakes, A., “Alternative Models for Moment Inequalities”, Econometrica

[size=13.3333px]· *Ho, K., “Insurer-Provider Networks in Medicare Market”, AER

[size=13.3333px]· *Holmes, T., “The Diffusion of Wal-Mart and Economies of Density”, Econometrica

[size=13.3333px]· #Ishii, J.,“Compatibility, Competition, and Investment in Network Industries: ATM Networks in the Banking Industry”, Rand

III. Dynamic Games

Benchmark Model (Nov 8/11) Lecture Note, Existence Proof

[size=13.3333px]· *Doralzelski, U. and Pakes, A., “A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in IO”, working paper, Harvard

[size=13.3333px]· Ericson, R. and Pakes, A., “Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work”, The Review of Economic Studies, 62 (1), 1995, 53-82

[size=13.3333px]Computation

[size=13.3333px]· *Pakes, A. and McGuire, P., “Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria: Numerical Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product Model”, Rand, 25, 1994, 555-589

[size=13.3333px]MATLAB codes kindly provided by Goettler and Gordon [size=13.3333px]http://goettler.simon.rochester.edu/research/GG_QME_code/GG_QME_code.html

[size=13.3333px]· *Benkard, L., “A Dynamic Analysis of Wide-bodied Commercial Aircraft”, Review of Economic Studies, 2004

[size=13.3333px]· *Pakes, A. and McGuire, P., “Stochastic Algorithms, Symmetric Markov-Perfect Equilibrium, and the Curse of Dimensionality”, Econometrica, 69 (5), 2001, 1261-1281

Estimation (Nov 18) Lecture Note

[size=13.3333px]· *Aguirregabiria, V. and Mira, P., “Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games”, Econometrica, 2007

[size=13.3333px]· *Bajari, P., Benkard, L., and Levin, J., “Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition”, Econometrica, 2007

[size=13.3333px]· Pakes, A., Ostrovsky, M. and Berry, S., “Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Examples)”, Rand, 2007

Two Examples of Discrete Choice Games (Nov 21) Lecture Note

[size=13.3333px]· *Collard-Wexler, A., “Demand Fluctuations and Plant Turnover in the Ready-Mix Concrete Industry”, Econometrica

[size=13.3333px]· Dunne et al., “Entry, Exit, and the Determinants of Market Structure”, RAND

Example of Continuous Choice Games (Nov 26) Due to time limit, we will only cover one paper. Lecture Note

[size=13.3333px]· *Ryan, S., “The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry”, Econometrica