Macro Keys
China De-leveraging – Where Are We?

Banks' WMPs and inter-FI leverage has declined

Regulatory and supervisory tightening has helped to curtail banks' wealth management
product (WMP) expansion and banks' claim on non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs).
Such developments should help contain shadow credit growth and reduce the risk of
any liquidity problem spreading through the system.

Credit growth slowed and costs increased

Tighter market conditions have led to lower corporate and local government bond
issuance. Shadow credit channels such as NBFIs' asset management businesses also
declined, which has likely helped to shrink "missing" shadow credit and leading to a
moderation in overall credit growth. Both bond yields and banks' average lending rates
have moved up, though the latter only marginally so.


De-leverage of the corporates and slower rise in total debt/GDP ratio

Corporate sector debt as a share of GDP declined notably in recent quarters. In
addition, thanks to slower credit growth and rebound in nominal GDP growth, China's
overall debt/GDP ratio rose at a much slower pace so far this year compared to 2015-
16. In fact, debt/GDP ratio hardly moved up in Q2 2017 from the Q1 level.

Can China de-leverage while maintain rapid growth?

China may be able to achieve a stable debt/GDP ratio within the next 3-5 years while
keeping GDP growth above 6% most of the time if: 1) consumption/services continue
to outpace investment/industry, 2) resource allocation improves with capacity reduction
and SOE reform, 3) investment is more driven by corporate profit than credit, and 4)
equity financing increase its importance overtime.

What are the risks?

The risk of a disorderly de-leverage in the next few years have declined in the past year.
A gradual de-leverage process may be interrupted or reversed due to 1) a sharp
economic slowdown, whether led by a serious property downturn or
geopolitical/external trade shock, which would lead to a deterioration of debt
dynamics; 2) emergence of new channels that enables rapid shadow credit expansion
and inter-FI leverage and risks; and 3) stagnation of SOE/supply side reform and failure
to improve resource allocation.