从经济学角度分析我国基层公务员激励机制

邹棱

（吉首大学 商学院，湖南 吉首 416000）

摘 要

：本文尝试运用激励经济学理论，针对地方公务员管理激励实践中或多或少存在着激励低效或失灵的问题。改进基层公务员激励机制要素的构成主要应逐步强化物质利益激励的色彩，重视精神层面的激励；加强公务员管理的竞争机制，增强团体的凝聚力和吸引力。以往对激励的研究主要着眼于激励的形成、表现形式和技术手段，较少涉及激励的经济学内涵，即激励以何种程度上导致组织绩效的提高。本文将致力于以经济学的新视角分析激励何以使组织不断获益、突破增长极限。
关键词：基层公务员；宏观增长模型；交易费用理论；有效激励；

From an Economic Point of View of the Local Civil Service
Incentive Mechanism in China

Zou Ling

(Jishou University Business School, Hunan Jishou 416000)

Abstract
: This paper attempts to use economic theory of incentives, incentives at the local civil service management practice, more or less incentive there is the problem of inefficiency or failure. Incentive mechanism to improve the grass-roots civil service elements should be a major incentive to gradually dilute the material interests of the color, attention to the spirit of the incentive levels; to strengthen the competitiveness of civil service management mechanism, and enhance group cohesion and attractiveness. Previous study of incentives aimed at stimulating the formation of expressions and technical means, and less involved in the economics content of incentives, that is, to what extent incentives lead to improved organizational performance. This article will focus on a new perspective to the economics analysis of motivation so that organizations can benefit from the growth limit exceeded.
Keywords:
Junior civil servants; capacity-building; transaction costs theory; incentives;