1 论文标题

Offshoring and Reshoring:

The Roles of Incomplete Contracts and Relative Bargaining Power

2 作者信息

Ngo Van Long

McGill University

Maxwell Tuuliy

University of Victoria

3 出处和链接

Cite this article:

Ngo Van Long, Maxwell Tuuli. Offshoring and Reshoring: The Roles of Incomplete Contracts and Relative Bargaining Power[J]. Front. Econ. China, 2018, 13(1): 32-51.

URL:

http://journal.hep.com.cn/fec/EN/10.3868/s060-007-018-0004-4 http://journal.hep.com.cn/fec/EN/Y2018/V13/I1/32

4 摘要

本文表明，如果发达国家和发展中国家的工资差距较小，发达国家企业相对于发展中国家承包商的议价能力的提高会引发外包回流到发达国家，以致只有拥有大量非熟练劳动力的行业才会发现外包有利可图。然而，如果发达国家和发展中国家工资差异很大，甚至连拥有大量熟练劳动力的行业也会采取外包，这时发达国家议价能力的提高会增加外包。

Offshoring and Reshoring:

The Roles of Incomplete Contracts and Relative Bargaining Power

Ngo Van Long

McGill University

Maxwell Tuuliy

University of Victoria

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that an increase inbargaining power of Northern firms relative to that of their Southern contractors can trigger reshoring if the North South wage differential is moderate, such that only industries with a high share of unskilled labor find outsourcing profitable. However, such an increase in Northern bargaining power can increase offshoring if the wage differential is so high that even industries with a low share of unskilled labor also offshore.

5.作者简介：

Ngo Van Long：麦吉尔大学经济系教授。研究领域为微观经济学里以下几个看似独立却紧密联系的方向：资源与环境经济学、国际贸易理论、经济学的动态优化理论与动态博弈、产业组织理论。其最近著作A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics (World Scientific, 2010)探讨了动态博弈如何成功应用在自然资源经济学、环境经济学、国际贸易与发展经济学、公共经济学、产业组织和宏观经济学六个领域，是对高级教材Dynamic Games in Economics and Management Science (Cambridge University Press,2000)一书的极佳补充。

Maxwell Tuuliy：维多利亚大学Peter B. Gustavson商学院博士后研究员，主要研究领域为国际贸易与产业组织，重点关注参与国际贸易的企业行为，与其组织结构的影响因素。研究兴趣也覆盖发展经济学和发展中及新兴经济体的开放经济宏观问题。