【资料名称】：Auction Theory, Second Edition
【资料作者】：Vijay Krishna
【出版社】：    Academic Press
【简介及目录】：   

Product Details  

• Hardcover: 336 pages
• Publisher: Academic Press; 2 edition (August 26, 2009)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0123745071

Product Description   
Vijay Krishna's 2e of Auction Theoryimprovesupon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package andpositionauctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapternotes. Completeproofs and new material about collusion complementKrishna's ability toreveal the basic facts of each theory in a stylethat is clear, concise,and easy to follow. With the addition of asolutions manual and otherteaching aids, the 2e continues to serve asthe doorway to relevanttheory for most students doing empirical workon auctions.
                                    

• Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions
• New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications
• NewLaTexBeamer slides, chapter-ending exercises, problems ofvaryingdifficulties, and a solutions manual support and reinforce keypoints

Review  
"Vijay Krishna's book provides avery thorough and patient presentationof auction theory, starting fromthe most basic analysis and graduatingto sophisticated, state of theart theory, including multi-unitauctions. This book covers a very widerange of auction topics,providing a clear and accessible treatment. Thetheory is presented ina careful and easily understood style accessibleto honorsundergraduates as well as all economics graduate students.Krishna'sbook will certainly become the central book on auction theory."
--R. Preston McAfee, Murray S. Johnson Chair in Economics, University of Texas

"Thisbooknot only sets out much of the theoretical literatureonauctions--including results that are very recent--but does so withaclarity, elegance, and rigor that is characteristic of VijayKrishna'swork."
--Eric Maskin, A.O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A.

"Thebookgives a superb presentation of auction theory, with clear andconciseproofs of all results. It is essential reading for any seriousstudentof auctions."
--Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland

"Thisisthe book we have been waiting for: a high level treatment ofauctiontheory that carefully presents the technical details necessaryfor anin depth understanding of the main themes of auction theory,ideal as abasis for a graduate course, and by an author who has himselfmadeimportant contributions to the subject."
--Paul Klemperer, Edgeworth Professor of Economics, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, U.K. -- Review  --This text refers to an alternate Hardcover edition.

Table of Contents
Introduction

                        I. Single Object Auctions:

PrivateValue Auctions,

The Revenue Equivalence Principle,

Qualifications andExtensions,

Mechanism Design,

Auctions with Interdependent Values,

TheRevenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle,

Asymmetries and OtherComplications,

Efficiency and the English Auction,

Mechanism Designwith Interdependent Values,

Bidding Rings

II. Multiple Object Auctions:

AnIntroduction to Multiple Object Auctions,

Equilibrium and Efficiencywith Private Values,

Some Revenue Considerations,

SequentialSales,

Nonidentical Objects,

Packages and Positions,

Multiple Objectsand Interdependent Values

III. Appendices:  

Continuous Distributions,

Stochastic Orders,

Order Statistics,

Affiliated Random Variables,

Some Linear Algebra