【资料名称】：Microeconomic Theory: A Concise Course
【资料作者】：James Bergin
【出版社】：    Oxford University Press, USA
【简介及目录】：

Product Details  

• Hardcover: 378 pages
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA; illustrated edition edition (August 11, 2005)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0199280290

Product Description  
MicroeconomicTheory provides a detailed discussion of the subjectmatter appearing ingraduate courses in microeconomic theory. Thepresentation isself-contained and provides key foundational insightson each topiccovered. This book will be of use to graduate students ofmicroeconomicsand more generally to those who need a brief modernaccount of thevarious areas of microeconomic theory.

Microeconomic Theory isbased on lecture notes for a graduate course inmicroeconomic theory. Itcovers a broad range of topics, and to someextent the lecture structureis retained in the style of the book. Theauthor provides a clearaccount of the main ideas in each areaconcisely, and in some depth ofdetail. The presentation is at anadvanced level and provides succinctcoverage of the material in a selfcontained discussion. Chapters areorganized and written independentlymaking it possible to read anychapter without having read earliermaterial. Each chaper is written onthe presumption that the reader hassome familiarity with the topics orissues under discussion but wouldvalue further discussion, or a secondpoint of view . While much of thematerial is mainstream, a substantialportion is not available inexisting textbooks. The book covers a rangeof topics appearing inadvanced courses in microeconomic theory.Coverage includes such topicsas decision theory, strategic andextensive form games, auctions,bargaining, information models,principal- agent problems, signallingand screening games, cooperativegames and models of learning.

About the Author  
JamesBergin is Professor of Economics at Queen's University andCanadaResearch Chair Holder. James holds degrees from Princeton,LondonSchool of Economics and the National University of Ireland.Hisresearch interests include mechanism design, learning andevolutionarygame theory, and anonymous games.

Table of Contents
A Brief Outline of the Chapters xvii
1.Decision Theory 1
2.Preferences, Risk, and Stochastic Dominance 21
3.Strategic Form Games 39
4.Nash Equilibrium—Existence and Refinements
5.Mechanism Design
6.Implementation: Complete and Incomplete Information
7.Auctions I: Independent Values
8.Auctions II: Dependent Values
9.Extensive Form Games
10.Equilibrium in Extensive Form Games
11.Repeated Games
12.Information
13.The Principal-Agent Problem
14.Signaling
15.Screening 255
16.Common Knowledge 267
17.Bargaining 281
18.Cooperative Outcomes 297
19.Anonymous Games 309
20.Evolution and Learning 323