英文文献：Business Dynamics and Informal Contracts: Experimental Evidence from the Cowpea Street Food Sector in West Africa-商业动态和非正式合同:来自西非豇豆街头食品部门的实验证据
英文文献作者：Otoo, Miriam,Fulton, Joan R.,Wu, Steven Y.,Ibro, Germaine
英文文献摘要：
We use field experiments in Niger to investigate the nature and efficiency of contractual structures in market transactions between kossai vendors and cowpea grinders (key input suppliers). Three contractual structures were employed: gift contract, standard price contract and discretionary bonus contract (most incomplete). Gift contracts and standard price contracts involve an upfront payment of grinding fees where discretionary bonus contracts involve payment after the quality of service is observed. Gift contracts were found to be the most ex-ante efficient with the highest acceptance rates. Discretionary bonus contracts (most incomplete) were the most ex-post efficient that is, resulted in the highest quality. Our results suggest that the degree of incompleteness of different contractual structures influences the outcome of market transactions in the cowpea street food sector in West Africa.

我们在尼日尔进行了田间实验，以调查kossai供应商与豇豆研磨商(主要投入供应商)之间的市场交易契约结构的性质和效率。采用了三种合同结构:礼品合同、标准价格合同和酌情奖金合同(大部分不完整)。礼品合同和标准价格合同包括预付研磨费，而自由裁量的奖金合同包括在服务质量得到保证后付款。研究发现，礼物合同在事前效率最高，通过率最高。自由裁量奖金合同(大部分不完整)是事后效率最高的，也就是说，导致了最高的质量。我们的结果表明，不同契约结构的不完全性程度影响西非豇豆街头食品部门的市场交易结果。