1.On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting 首作者：Dilip Abreu
2.The folk Theorem for Repeated Games:A Neu Condition 首作者：Dilip Abreu
3.Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring 首作者：Dilip Abreu
4.Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring 首作者：Olivier Compte
5.Trade Expansion and Contract Enforcement 首作者：Avinash Dixit
6.Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching 首作者：Glenn Ellison
7.The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 首作者：Drew Fudenberg
8.The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 首作者：Drew Fudenberg
9.The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring 首作者：Michihiro Kandori
10.Social Norms and Community Enforcement 首作者：Michihiro Kandori

请问这些当中哪些比较简单呢？非常感谢大家！