本文转编于微信公众号：麦哲学术

获取更多管理学权威期刊学术前沿，请关注我们！

1.  通过在线市场获利

Monetizing Online Marketplaces

作者：Hana Choi , Carl F. Mela

本文考虑了在线市场的货币化。这些平台权衡了广告费用和产品销售佣金。尽管以广告产品为特色可以降低搜索效率（降低交易佣金），但它可以激励卖方通过广告竞争更好的展示位置（增加广告费用）。我们通过对平台的两侧进行建模来考虑这种折衷。在需求方面，我们开发了一个浏览（展示），点击和购买的联合模型。在供应方面，我们考虑了各种费用结构（每英里成本，每次点击成本（CPC）和每动作成本）和排名算法下的卖方估值和广告竞争。利用来自在线市场的买方，卖方和平台数据，在这些市场中广告收入会影响所列卖方项目的顺序，我们探索了各种产品排名和广告定价机制。我们发现，按期望的销售收入对低于第五位的商品进行排序，同时对排名前5位的CPC进行竞价会带来最大的利润增长（181％），因为这种方法可以平衡最高排名广告中的最高估值与交易收入在较低的位置。

This paperconsiders the monetization of online marketplaces. These platforms trade offfees from advertising with commissions from product sales. Although featuringadvertised products can make search less efficient (lowering transactioncommissions), it incentivizes sellers to compete for better placements viaadvertising (increasing advertising fees). We consider this trade-off bymodeling both sides of the platform. On the demand side, we develop a jointmodel of browsing (impressions), clicking, and purchase. On the supply side, weconsider sellers’ valuations and advertising competition under various feestructures (cost-per-mille, cost-per-click (CPC), and cost-per-action) andranking algorithms. Using buyer, seller, and platform data from an onlinemarketplace where advertising dollars affect the order of seller items listed,we explore various product-ranking and ad-pricing mechanisms. We find that sortingitems below the fifth position by expected sales revenue while conducting a CPCauction in the top 5 positions yields the greatest improvement in profits(181%) because this approach balances the highest valuations from advertisingin the top positions with the transaction revenues in the lower positions.

2.  季票买家价值和二级市场选择

SeasonTicket Buyer Value and Secondary Market Options

作者：Michael Lewis , Yanwen Wang , Chunhua Wu

体育特许经营权的收入很大一部分来自季票持有者。可能影响季票管理的发展是合法二级市场的增长。我们开发了一种结构模型，将二级市场的供需双方都整合到季票购买者的购票和使用选择中。我们使用一个面板数据集，该数据集将季节和单张机票购买记录与机票使用情况数据相结合，以调查二级市场的价值。我们估计，二级市场可使球队的季票收入每季增加约100万美元。在单个季票客户的水平上，我们估计客户生命周期价值的增长范围从质量最低的座位级别的1,327美元到价格最高的座位级别的2,553美元。就客户的价值而言，拥有二级市场的平均美元价值为每张季票138美元。在各个细分市场中，二级市场在豪华座位层提供了4％的折扣，而在经济座位层提供了11％的折扣。二级市场在高端机票细分市场中创造了更多价值，而二级市场对低价格细分市场的行为影响最大。

Sportsfranchises derive significant portions of their revenues from season ticketholders. A development that may affect season ticket management is the growthof legal secondary markets. We develop a structural model that integrates boththe supply and demand sides of the secondary market into season ticket buyers’ticket purchase and usage choices. We use a panel data set that combines seasonand single ticket purchase records with ticket usage data to investigate thevalue of secondary markets. We estimate that the secondary market increases theteam’s season ticket revenues by about $1 million per season. At the level ofthe individual season ticket customer, we estimate an increase in customerlifetime value ranging from $1,327 in the lowest quality seat tier to $2,553 inthe highest. In terms of value to the customer, the average dollar value ofhaving a secondary market is $138 per season ticket. Across segments, thesecondary market provides the equivalent of a 4% discount in the premium seattier versus an 11% discount in the economy seat tier. Whereas the secondarymarket creates more value in the premium-ticket tier segments, the secondarymarket has the most impact on behavior in the low price oriented segment.

3.  广告和令人上瘾的商品需求：电子烟广告的影响

Advertising and Demand for Addictive Goods: TheEffects of E-Cigarette Advertising

作者：Anna E. Tuchman

尽管自1971年以来就禁止电视广告使用传统香烟，但电子香烟广告仍然不受管制。电子烟广告的效果已经引起了激烈的争论，但是对市场​​的经验分析却很有限。通过分析个人数据和汇总数据，我提供了描述性证据，表明电子烟广告减少了对传统香烟的需求，并且个人将电子烟和传统香烟视为替代品。然后，我指定了一种对香烟需求的结构模型，该模型结合了成瘾性并允许家庭之间的异质性。该模型使我能够利用这两个数据集的信息内容来确定整个市场的口味变化以及上瘾导致的对选择的依赖状态。使用需求模型估算，我评估了拟议中的禁令对电子烟电视广告的影响。我发现，在没有电子烟广告的情况下，对传统香烟的需求将会增加，这表明禁止电子烟广告可能会产生意想不到的后果。

Although TVadvertising for traditional cigarettes has been banned since 1971, advertisingfor e-cigarettes remains unregulated. The effects of e-cigarette ads have beenheavily debated, but empirical analysis of the market has been limited.Analyzing both individual and aggregate data, I present descriptive evidenceshowing that e-cigarette advertising reduces demand for traditional cigarettesand that individuals treat e-cigarettes and traditional cigarettes assubstitutes. I then specify a structural model of demand for cigarettes thatincorporates addiction and allows for heterogeneity across households. Themodel enables me to leverage the information content of both data sets toidentify variation in tastes across markets and the state dependence induced onchoice by addiction. Using the demand model estimates, I evaluate the impact ofa proposed ban on e-cigarette television advertising. I find that in theabsence of e-cigarette advertising, demand for traditional cigarettes wouldincrease, suggesting that a ban on e-cigarette advertising may have unintendedconsequences.

4.  搜索广告：搜索引擎之间的预算分配

SearchAdvertising: Budget Allocation Across Search Engines

作者：Mohammad Zia , Ram C. Rao

在本文中，我们将调查多个搜索平台上广告客户的预算和出价策略。我们开发了一个具有两个平台和预算有限的广告客户的模型，它们可以竞争跨平台的广告位。当平台底价低且外生时，我们发现对称的广告商采用不对称的预算分配策略并部分区分：一个广告商将其预算份额分配给平台A，高于A的用户流量份额和分配给B的预算份额。低于B的用户流量份额，而第二个广告客户则相反。这种部分差异平衡了两种力量：由希望出现在两个平台上以获得更多点击次数的需求力，以及由希望在至少一个平台上占主导地位以较低成本获得点击次数的需求所驱动的战略力。然后，我们证明，如果平台从战略上提高其底价，则广告客户差异化的收益就会减少。在最大限度地利用平台收益的底价下，广告客户按与每个平台的用户流量份额成比例分配预算，并且平台完全可以使用这些预算。

In thispaper, we investigate advertisers’ budgeting and bidding strategies acrossmultiple search platforms. We develop a model with two platforms andbudget-limited advertisers that compete for advertising slots across platforms.When platform reserve prices are low and exogenous, we find that symmetricadvertisers pursue asymmetric budget allocation strategies and partiallydifferentiate: one advertiser allocates a share of its budget to platform Ahigher than A’s share of user traffic and a share of its budget to platform Blower than B’s share of user traffic, whereas the second advertiser does thereverse. This partial differentiation balances two forces: a demand forcearising from a desire to be present on both platforms to obtain more clicks anda strategic force driven by a desire to be budget dominant on at least oneplatform to obtain clicks at a lower cost. We then show that the benefit fromdifferentiation for advertisers diminishes if platforms strategically increasetheir reserve prices. At reserve prices that maximize platform revenues,advertisers allocate their budgets proportional to each platform’s share ofuser traffic, and platforms fully appropriate these budgets.

5.  测试和滚动：利润最大化的A / B测试

Test & Roll: Profit-Maximizing A/B Tests

作者：Elea McDonnell Feit , Ron Berman

营销人员通常使用A / B测试作为工具来比较测试阶段中的营销方式，然后将性能更好的方式应用于其余的消费者群体。传统上使用假设检验对这些检验进行分析，但我们将其重构为检验的机会成本（某些客户获得次优治疗）与在次要治疗的其余部分部署次优治疗相关的潜在损失之间的显式权衡。人口。我们推导了最大化利润的检验规模的封闭形式的表达式，并表明它比假设检验通常建议的规模小得多，尤其是当响应嘈杂或总人口较少时。通过使用不对称先验可以合理地使用小保留组。拟议的测试设计在各种条件下都可以实现与柔性但难于实施的多臂匪盗几乎相同的预期遗憾。我们在三种不同的营销环境（网站设计，展示广告和目录测试）中展示了该方法的好处，在这些环境中，我们可以根据过去的数据估算先验数据。在所有这三种情况下，最佳样本量都比传统假设检验小得多，从而带来了更高的利润。

Marketers often use A/B testing as atool to compare marketing treatments in a test stage and then deploy the better-performingtreatment to the remainder of the consumer population. Whereas these tests havetraditionally been analyzed using hypothesis testing, we reframe them as anexplicit trade-off between the opportunity cost of the test (where somecustomers receive a suboptimal treatment) and the potential losses associatedwith deploying a suboptimal treatment to the remainder of the population. Wederive a closed-form expression for the profit-maximizing test size and showthat it is substantially smaller than typically recommended for a hypothesistest, particularly when the response is noisy or when the total population issmall. The common practice of using small holdout groups can be rationalized byasymmetric priors. The proposed test design achieves nearly the same expectedregret as the flexible yet harder-to-implement multi-armed bandit under a widerange of conditions. We demonstrate the benefits of the method in threedifferent marketing contexts—website design, display advertising, and catalogtests—in which we estimate priors from past data. In all three cases, theoptimal sample sizes are substantially smaller than for a traditionalhypothesis test, resulting in higher profit.

6.  基于选择的联合分析中规模的战略意义

TheStrategic Implications of Scale in Choice-Based Conjoint Analysis

作者：John R. Hauser , Felix Eggers , Matthew Selove

基于选择的联合（CBC）研究已经开始依靠模拟器来预测定价，战略产品定位和专利/版权估价的均衡价格。尽管CBC的研究长期以来一直专注于属性级别的估计相对部分价值的准确性，但是预测的均衡价格和战略定位却出乎意料地并极大地取决于规模：部分价值的大小（包括价格系数）相对于误差项的大小。尽管规模对估计异质部分价值的能力的影响是众所周知的，但是文献和当前实践都没有解决定价和规模定位的敏感性。这种敏感性很重要，因为（估计的）规模取决于看似无害的市场研究决策，例如属性是用文字还是用逼真的图像来描述。我们使用风格化模型（其中明确地建模异质性）展示规模的战略意义。如果一家公司对CBC研究的质量视而不见，并采取了错误地观察规模的行动，那么追随者而不是创新者会犯下代价高昂的战略错误。外部有效的规模估算极为重要。我们凭经验证明，图像现实主义和激励措施对规模的影响足以改变战略决策，并影响专利/版权估价达数亿美元。

Choice-basedconjoint (CBC) studies have begun to rely on simulators to forecast equilibriumprices for pricing, strategic product positioning, and patent/copyright valuations.Whereas CBC research has long focused on the accuracy of estimated relativepartworths of attribute levels, predicted equilibrium prices and strategicpositioning are surprisingly and dramatically dependent on scale: the magnitudeof the partworths (including the price coefficient) relative to the magnitudeof the error term. Although the impact of scale on the ability to estimateheterogeneous partworths is well known, neither the literature nor currentpractice address the sensitivity of pricing and positioning to scale. Thissensitivity is important because (estimated) scale depends on seeminglyinnocuous market-research decisions such as whether attributes are described bytext or by realistic images. We demonstrate the strategic implications of scaleusing a stylized model in which heterogeneity is modeled explicitly. If a firmshirks on the quality of a CBC study and acts on incorrectly observed scale, afollower, but not an innovator, can make costly strategic errors. Externallyvalid estimates of scale are extremely important. We demonstrate empiricallythat image realism and incentive alignment affect scale sufficiently to changestrategic decisions and affect patent/copyright valuations by hundreds ofmillions of dollars.