英文文献：Fat-tail Climate Risks, Mechanism design, and Reputation-肥尾气候风险、机制设计和声誉
英文文献作者：Banerjee, Prasenjit,Shogren, Jason F.
英文文献摘要：
This paper investigates the interaction between consumers and producers in designing incentive mechanism for climate protection. Firms have material interests in building a moral reputation for those consumers who prefer buying from socially responsible firms. We examine optimal monetary transfer by addressing crowding out effect due to reputation. We find green reputation leads to overprotection and brown firms buy reputation if consumers have strong preference on green products. When consumers care less about firms’ reputation, firms do not have any incentive to buy reputation.

本文探讨了消费者与生产者在气候保护激励机制设计中的互动关系。企业在为那些更愿意从有社会责任感的企业购买产品的消费者建立道德声誉方面拥有物质利益。我们研究最优的货币转移解决挤出效应由于声誉。我们发现绿色声誉会导致过度保护，当消费者对绿色产品有强烈偏好时，棕色企业会购买声誉。当消费者不太关心企业声誉时，企业就没有购买声誉的动机。