结构改革和选举：来自全球新数据集的证据

STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND ELECTIONS:EVIDENCE FROM A WORLD-WIDE NEW DATASET

作者：

阿尔贝托·F·阿莱西纳（Alberto F. Alesina）

戴维·弗塞里（Davide Furceri）

乔纳森·D·奥斯特里（Jonathan D. Ostry）

克里斯·帕帕乔吉欧（Chris Papageorgiou）

丹尼斯·奎因（Dennis P. Quinn）

We assemble two unique databases. One is on reforms in domestic finance, external finance,trade, product markets and labor markets, which covers 90 advanced and developing economiesfrom 1973 to 2014. The other is on electoral results and timing of elections. In the 66democracies considered in the paper, we show that liberalizing reforms engender benefits for theeconomy, but they materialize only gradually over time. Partly because of this delayed effect, andpossibly because voters are impatient or do not anticipate future benefits, liberalizing reforms arecostly to incumbents when implemented close to elections. We also find that the electoral effectsdepend on the state of the economy at the time of reform: reforms are penalized duringcontractions; liberalizing reforms undertaken in expansions are often rewarded. Voters seem toattribute current economic conditions to the reforms without fully internalizing the delay that ittakes for reforms to bear fruit.
我们组装两个独特的数据库。一种是关于国内金融，外部金融，贸易，产品市场和劳动力市场的改革，该改革涵盖了1973年至2014年的90个发达和发展中经济体。另一种是关于选举结果和选举时间的。在本文所考虑的66个民主国家中，我们表明，自由化改革可以为经济带来收益，但随着时间的推移它们只会逐步实现。部分原因是这种延迟的影响，可能是因为选民不耐烦或无法预期未来的利益，自由化的改革在接近选举的情况下对在位者而言代价高昂。我们还发现，选举的效果取决于改革时的经济状况：改革在紧缩时期受到惩罚；改革在紧缩时期受到惩罚；改革在紧缩时期受到惩罚。扩大扩张中进行的改革通常会得到回报。