英文文献：National School Lunch Program Menus: A Moral Hazard Problem-国家学校午餐计划菜单:一个道德风险问题
英文文献作者：Capogrossi, Kristen,You, Wen
英文文献摘要：
Decisions are made daily concerning many facets of the National School Lunch Program at the federal, state and local levels, but how are decisions made with regard to the actual choice of foods on school lunch menus? No study that we are aware of examines the incentives and barriers among the SFAs decision-making process with regard to the provision of healthier lunch menus. The issue faced by SFAs is a classic moral hazard problem: a SFA’s effort for the provision of healthy menu options is unknown (i.e., hidden actions). SFAs can accept federal funds and agricultural commodities to provide healthy lunches while districts create school wellness policies “requiring” minimum nutritional quality of school-provided foods, but the overall quality of implementation and compliance are not observable. This paper utilizes the Principal-Agent (PA) theory to model this moral hazard problem and unveil the barriers and incentive targets and channels behind the observed inefficient school nutrition policy implementation.

联邦、州和地方各级每天都要就国家学校午餐计划的诸多方面做出决定，但如何就学校午餐菜单上的实际食物选择做出决定呢?据我们所知，没有一项研究调查SFAs在提供更健康午餐菜单方面的决策过程中的激励因素和障碍。SFAs面临的问题是一个典型的道德风险问题:SFA提供健康菜单选项的努力是未知的(即，隐藏的行动)。SFAs可以接受联邦资金和农产品来提供健康午餐，而各学区则制定学校健康政策，“要求”学校提供的食品的最低营养质量，但执行和遵守的总体质量并不明显。本文运用委托-代理(PA)理论对这一道德风险问题建模，揭示了学校营养政策执行效率低下背后的障碍、激励目标和激励渠道。