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Intellectually rewarding as this territory has proved to be, it remains in some respects rocky. The science wars of the 1990s pointed to some of the dangers of “studying up,” especially as the social sciences sought to create new, autonomous ways of describing scientific and technological activity. Socializing epistemology proved to be no easy task. Analysts faced a two-fold challenge. They had to find meaningful ways of redescribing scientists’ interactions with nature, imbuing those processes with new social meaning; and they had to break the monopoly that scientists had long enjoyed as the only actors authorized to produce trustworthy accounts of the nature of their activities. Law, too, has enjoyed a similar double monopoly—first, by controlling the language in which legal products must be written to be recognized as law, and second, by guarding the professional right to tell the rest of society how the law “really works.” To gain that wider hearing, research will have to reach beyond its parochial, field-specific, epistemological concerns and find new ways to engage with sympathetic critics of the law, both within and outside the circles of formal legal scholarship. Analysts have been most sensitive thus far to the law’s role in making scientific facts and in drawing the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate expertise. it is the law’s role in producing “indifference” that has attracted the most sustained interest; and, not surprisingly perhaps, judges, as the supreme text writers of the law, have commanded more diligent attention than other less forceful and sometimes less articulate players, such as lawyers, juries, and litigants themselves. As we have seen, the focus on epistemology has led some STS scholars into playing active roles in the legal system, most visibly as actual or would-be expert witnesses on behalf of science, but also, less visibly, as advisers and educators to the elites of the law, in the trial bar, advisory committees, regulatory agencies, and the judiciary. But these ad hoc and personal encounters only skim the surface of the field’s potential for constructive critique. With modernity’s two most important ordering institutions as their objects of study, analysts of science and the law are uniquely positioned to explore and question the hidden normativities underpinning the demarcations that matter in contemporary society. These, as the CLS movement and its intellectual descendants most cogently argued, are the divides that consistently separate the weak from the strong, the rich from the poor, the disabled from the competent, and the socially marginal from the powerful and privileged.
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