缓解科学界信任危机的新机制-在公共物品博弈中的应用

A NEW MECHANISM TO ALLEVIATE THE CRISES OF CONFIDENCE IN SCIENCE-WITHAN APPLICATION TO THE PUBLIC GOODS GAME

作者：

路易吉·布泰拉（Luigi Butera）

菲利普·格罗斯曼（Philip J. Grossman）

丹尼尔·豪瑟（Daniel Houser）

约翰·A·李斯特（John A. List）

玛丽·克莱尔·维耶瓦尔（Marie-Claire Villeval）

Creation of empirical knowledge in economics has taken a dramatic turn in the past few decades.One feature of the new research landscape is the nature and extent to which scholars generatedata. Today, in nearly every field the experimental approach plays an increasingly crucial role intesting theories and informing organizational decisions. Whereas there is much to appreciateabout this revolution, recently a credibility crisis has taken hold across the social sciences,arguing that an important component of Fischer (1935)'s tripod has not been fully embraced:replication. Indeed, while the importance of replications is not debatable scientifically, currentincentives are not sufficient to encourage replications from the individual researcher'sperspective. We analyze a novel mechanism that promotes replications by leveraging mutuallybeneficial gains between scholars and editors. We develop a model capturing the trade-offsinvolved in seeking independent replications before submission of a paper to journals. Wedemonstrate the operation of this method via an investigation of the effects of Knightianuncertainty on cooperation rates in public goods games, a pervasive and yet largely unexploredfeature in the literature.
在过去的几十年中，经济学中经验知识的创造发生了戏剧性的转变。新的研究格局的一个特征是学者生成数据的性质和程度。如今，几乎在每个领域，实验方法在检验理论和通知组织决策方面都发挥着越来越重要的作用。尽管这场革命有很多值得赞赏的地方，但最近社会科学界爆发了一场信誉危机，认为菲舍尔（1935）三脚架的一个重要组成部分并未得到充分拥抱：复制。确实，虽然复制的重要性在科学上尚无定论，但从个人研究者的角度来看，当前的激励措施不足以鼓励复制。我们分析了一种新颖的机制，该机制通过利用学者和编辑之间的互惠互利来促进复制。我们开发了一个模型，该模型捕获了在向期刊提交论文之前寻求独立复制所涉及的权衡。我们通过研究骑士主义不确定性对公共物品博弈中合作率的影响来证明这种方法的有效性，这是文献中普遍存在但尚未探索的特征。