From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance: Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy
by Kiichiro Yagi (Editor)

About the Author
Kiichiro Yagi is the ex-president of Setsunan University, Osaka, Japan. He taught History of Economics and Political Economy at Okayama University, Kyoto University, and Setsunan University. He served as the President of Japan Society of the History of economic Thought, Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics, and Japan Society of Political Economy, successively. His many publication includes Social Economics of Modern Japan (1999 in Japanese), Potitical Economy (2006 in Japanese), and Austrian and German Economic Thought (2011 in English). He is currently the editor-in-chief of Evolutionary and Institutional Economic Review.

Abou this book
This book combines modern evolutionary economics and classical political economy. Modern evolutionary economics with its pluralistic and contingent view of reproduction does not presuppose equilibrium or harmonious reproduction. A society that consists of multiple agents needs to establish an order from the interactions of those agents. The book introduces a normative and a practical dimension where mutual justification occurs through the act of exchange. Mutual justification ultimately leads to the emergence of social and economic order, an approach that the author dubs “approval theory.” The division of labor proceeds alongside the emergence of money and capital, and the book discusses the dual structure of the real and financial economy that is the consequence. It then interprets collective action using the twin concept of voice and exit and proposes the concept of evolutionary governance to explain the politico-economic aspects of the social economy.

As such, this book shows the promising direction in which the modern political economy is now proceeding, in accordance with the contingent process of evolutionary reproduction. Further, two collaborating authors supply a game-theoretical interpretation of approval theory and an exploration of the evolution of dynamical systems, respectively.

Brief Contents
Part I Political Economy
1 From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance
2 Approval Theory and Social Contract
3 Economic Exchange and Social Exchange
4 Institutional Dynamics of the Capitalist Market Economy
5 Evolution of Commercial and Financial Structures of Capitalism
6 System Transition and the Institutional Political Economy
Part I Appendices
Part II Further Explorations
7 Interpretation of Approval Theory Related to Norms and Interests: Interpretation by Image Score Model and Reputation Dynamics
8 On the Relatedness Between R. A. Fisher’s FTNS and J. S. Metcalfe’s Construction

Series: Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science (20) (Book 20)
Pages: 207
Publisher: Springer; 1st ed. 2020 edition (May 12, 2020)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 4431549978
ISBN-13: 978-4431549970