Incentives for China's urban mayors to mitigate pollution externalities:
The role of the central government and public environmentalism

Siqi Zheng , Matthew E. Kahn , Weizeng Sun , Danglun Luo
Regional Science and Urban Economics

China's extremely high levels of urban air, water and greenhouse gas emission levels pose local and global environmental
challenges. China's urban leaders have substantial influence and discretion over the evolution of economic
activity that generates such externalities. This paper examines the political economy of urban leaders' incentives
to tackle pollution issues. We present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that both the central government
and the public are placing pressure on China's urban leaders to mitigate externalities. Such “pro-green” incentives
suggest that many of China's cities could enjoy significant environmental progress in the near future.

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