http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~jel292/torture.pdf

Torture
Sandeep Baliga † Jeffrey C. Ely ‡
July 24, 2010
Abstract
We study torture as a mechanism for extracting information from
a suspect who may or may not be informed. We show that the optimal
use of torture is hindered by two commitment problems. First,
the principal would benefit from a commitment to torture a victim
he knows to be innocent. Second, the principal would benefit from
a commitment to limit the amount of torture faced by the guilty. We
analyze a dynamic model of torture in which the credibility of these
threats and promises are endogenous. We show that these commitment
problems dramatically reduce the value of torture and can even
render it completely ineffective. We use our model to address questions
such as the effect of enhanced interrogation techniques, rights
against indefinite detention, and delegation of torture to specialists.
Keywords: commitment, waterboarding, sleep deprivation, ratchet effect .