【原文出处】兰州商学院学报

【原刊期号】20101

【原刊页号】48～55

【分 类 号】F52

【分 类 名】国际贸易研究

【复印期号】201006

【英文标题】Basis, Mode and Benefits Distribution of Processing Trade: A Literature Review

【标题注释】收稿日期：2009-12-10

【作 者】王怀民

【作者简介】王怀民(1965-)，男，河南内黄人，教授，博士，研究方向：国际贸易，河南财经学院国际经济贸易学院，河南　郑州　450011

【内容提要】本文回顾了近年来研究加工贸易产生的原因、加工贸易的分工模式和生产控制模式以及加工贸易利益分配的有关文献。跨国公司为提高劳动生产率、降低生产成本或为获取竞争优势而推动加工贸易活动，运输成本和贸易壁垒的降低是加工贸易大规模开展的前提，发达国家或地区在市场、技术、人才和资本方面的优势使其能够占据研发环节，法律环境、国家规模、基础设施、贸易成本将影响零部件生产环节的国际分工，劳动力成本是影响加工装配环节国际分工的最主要因素，基础设施、法律环境、工人的技能水平也会影响加工装配环节的国际分工，在销售环节，中间人依靠的是信息优势、专业技能优势和信誉优势。研究结果还表明，委托人和中间人主要通过转移定价的手段获取大部分贸易利益。

【摘 要 题】加工贸易

【英文摘要】This paper reviews the relevant literature on causes, mode of division and production controlling, benefit distribution of processing trade. Multinational companies promote the processing trade as a result of improving productivity and reducing production costs or obtaining a competitive advantage, the decline in transport costs and trade barriers is the prerequisite to carry out large-scale processing trade, advantages of the developed countries or regions in market, technology, talent and capital enable them to occupy the R&D chain, the legal environment, national scale, infrastmcture and trading costs will affect the international division of parts production, and labor cost is the most important factor that influences the international division of processing and assembling procedure as well as the infrastructure, legal environment and skill level of the labor force, while in the procedure of sale, what the mediator relys is the advantages of information, professional skills and credibility. The research also shows that the client and mediator get most of the trade interests mainly through the means of transfer pricing.

【关 键 词】加工贸易的基础/加工贸易模式/加工贸易利益分配

    basis of processing trade/mode of processing trade/benefit distribution of processing trade

【正 文】

【参考文献】

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