Contributing to a public good problem

leopoldwilson

2949

收藏 2011-02-03

悬赏 3000 个论坛币未解决

Each of n people chooses whether or not tocontribute a fixed amount toward the provision of a public good. The good isprovided if and only if at least kpeople contribute, where 2 <= k <= n ; if it is not provided, contributions are not refunded. Eachperson ranks outcomes from best to worst as follows: (i) any outcome in whichthe good is provided and she does not contribute, (ii) any outcome in which thegood is provided and she contributes, (iii) any outcome in which the good isnot provided and she does not contribute, (iv) any outcome in which the good isnot provided and she contributes. Formulate this situation as a strategic gameand find its Nash equilibria. (Is there a Nash equilibrium in which more than k people contribute? One in which k people contribute? One in which fewerthan k people contribute? (Becareful!))

这是Osborne的An Introduction to Game Theory的33.1题。

小组讨论出现分歧，需要大家的帮助。需要在1小时之内得到答案。（金币也只会给在1小时内给出正确答案的朋友。一小时以后，3:30AM，悬赏自动作废。）

谢谢。