1.1. Relationship between Different Indicators of State Capacity 3
1.2. Fragile Indicators Correlations 9
1.3. Time Spent Being Fragile 9
1.4. Macroeconomic Characteristics of Fragile States 10
1.5. Fiscal and External Situation in Fragile States 12
1.6. The Poverty Trap and the Fragility Trap 15
2.1. The Narrow Corridor 44
2.2. Doors into the Corridor 48
3.1. Generating Social Pressure for Compliance 70
4.1. Number of Violent Events in Somalia, 1990–2010 89
4.2. Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Statehood (2015) 90
4.3. Undernourishment and Statehood 2015 91
4.4. Infant Mortality and Areas of Limited Statehood (2015) 92
4.5. What Makes Governance Effective in Areas of Limited Statehood? 93
5.1. Fragility and Political Legitimacy 111
5.2. The Slippery Slope Framework 114
5.3. The Extended Slippery Slope Framework 115
6.1. The Fragile States Index in 2018, by Country 130
6.2. Discontinuities in Economic Variables at Various Levels of Fragility 131
6.3. New Business Density (3-Year Average) 138
6.4. Age of Establishment 139
6.5. Formality at Start of Operation 140
6.6. Length of Informality 140
6.7. Informal Employment in Total Employment, excl. Agriculture 141
6.8. Sole Proprietorship (% of Total) 142
6.9. Real Annual Sales Growth (%) 143
6.10. Annual Employment Growth 144
6.11. Capacity Utilization 145
6.12. Annual Labor Productivity Growth (%) 145

6.14. Share of Enterprises Exporting Directly or Indirectly 148
6.15. Share of Enterprises Exporting Directly 148
6.16. Share of Total Sales Exported Directly (%) 149
6.17. Export Diversification 151
6.18. Export Quality 152
6.19. Economic Growth Volatility 153
6.20. Inflation Rate Volatility 153
6.21. Interest Rate Volatility 154
6.22. Exchange Rate Volatility 155
6.23. Enterprises with Bank Loan/Line of Credit (% of Total) 155
6.24. Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) 156
6.25. Enterprises Using Banks to Finance Investments (% of Total) 157
6.26. National Investments Financed by Banks (%) 157
6.27. Corruption as a Major Constraint (%) 160
6.28. Practices of Informal Sector as a Major Constraint (%) 160
6.29. Enterprises Experiencing Water Insufficiencies (%) 162
6.30. # of Water Insufficiencies in Typical Month 162
6.31. Electrical Outages in a Typical Month 163
6.32. Losses due to Electrical Outages (% of sales) 163
6.33. National Sales Lost to Theft and Vandalism (% of total) 165
6.34. Share of Sales Lost to Theft/Vandalism (%) 165
6.35. Share of Enterprises Paying for Security (%) 166
6.36. Average Security Costs (% of Sales) 167
6.37. Generator Ownership 167
6.38. Electricity Generated by Generators 168
7.1. Financial Depth in Fragile States 188
7.2. Banking Depth Throughout the World 189
7.3. Composite Financial Development Indicators, 2018 193
7.4. Fragile States: Income Level and Financial Depth 194
7.5. Fragile States Estimated Growth Costs of Financial Underdevelopment,
based on FD 204
8.1. Equilibrium for Given Values of π and Lx 218
8.2. Phase Diagram Near the Steady State 221
8.3. Employment Allocation and Output, by Sector; Political Policymaker
Optimal Plan 228
8.4. Public Employment and Probability of State Failure; by Scenario. 228

8.5. Macroeconomic Outcomes 229
8.6. Steady-State Public Employment—Comparative Statics with Respect
to Foreign Aid 230
9.1. Complementarity between Capacities and Income: Income Taxes and
Contract Enforcement by GDP 243
9.2. The Violence Trap and Fiscal Capacity 244
9.3. Conflict Risk and Fiscal Capacity between and within Country Evidence 245
9.4. Conflict Risk and Fiscal Capacity: Case Studies 246
9.5. Economic Fragility and Fiscal Capacity between and within
Country Evidence 256
10.1. The Long Route of Accountability Spiral and Leakage 275
10.2. Odds Ratios of Increasing/Decreasing Activity Across Given Governance
Indicators (both periods) 285
10.3. Low FMIS Budget Coverage Means Low Expenditure Control 288
10.4. No Simple Relationship between Change in Governance and Infant
Mortality Outcomes 291
10.5. Variations in Governance Improvement Across Two Time Periods 292
11.1. Tax Revenue in Fragile and Non-Fragile States 301
(Simple average for 2013–16)
11.2. Tax Revenues in Permanent versus Successful Fragile States 302
(Simple Average, 2013–16)
11.3. Public Expenditure Composition in Fragile States versus Non-Fragile States 314
(Percent of GDP—simple average for 2013–16)
11.4. Average Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Scores for
Fragile States Compared to Low-Income Countries and Emerging
Market Economies 315
11.5. IMF Conditionality and Tax Revenue (126 low- and middle-income
countries, 1993–2013) 326
11.6. Number of Expenditure Conditions per Program 328
13.1. De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes: “Never Fragile” Countries 371
13.2. De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes: “Always Fragile” Countries 372
13.3. Evolution of “Post-Crisis” of Nominal Anchors (1971–2017) 379
13.4. Bank of Uganda Policy Rate: July 2011–April 2015 387
14.1. Exchange Regimes in Fragile and Non-Fragile Economies 409
14.2. Aid-for-Debt Swap Shock 428
(Floating Exchange Regime, No Frictions, and No Learning by Exporting)
14.3. Aid-for-Debt Swap Shock 430
14.4. Aid-for-Government Expenditures Shock 432

14.5. Shock to Government Expenditures 434
(Floating Exchange Regime, No Frictions, and No Learning by Exporting)
14.6. Positive Shock to Government Expenditures 435
14.7. Positive Shock to Public Investment 437
(Floating Exchange Regime, No Frictions, and No Learning by Exporting)
14.8. Positive Shock to Public Investment 439
15.1. State Fragility and Economic Performance 454
15.2. Country Fragility, Poverty, and Inequality 455
15.3. Financial Flows by Fragility 460
15.4. Volatility of Financial Flows 461
15.5. Financial Flows and Growth Accelerations and Slowdowns 470
15.6. Financial Flows and Employment by Economic Class 473
15.7. Sectoral Employment Changes, by Level of State Fragility 474
16.1. Median Official Development Assistance over Time 499
(Percent of GDP)
16.2. Official Development Assistance to GDP, by Country 500
16.3. Aid, Foreign Direct Investment, and Remittances to Fragile States 501
16.4. Unpredictability of Aid 502
16.5. Different Measures of Donor Fragmentation in Fragile States 503
16.6. Sectoral Allocation in Fragile Countries 504
16.7. Evolution of Budget Support versus Project Aid 504
16.8. Aid Disbursed through NGOs 506
16.9. Share of Successful Projects 506
16.10. Project Success and Conflicts in Uganda 512
16.11. Control of Corruption: Fragile and Non-Fragile States 516
17.1. Persistence of State Fragility, 2000–18 525
(Number of Countries)
17.2. Distribution of Fragile State Arrangements or Instruments,
by Type, 2006–17 (Percent) 529
17.3. IMF Technical Assistance to Fragile versus Non-Fragile States, FY 2009–17 530
(Person-Years of Field Delivery; Percent)
17.4. Evolution of Tax Revenue Surrounding IMF Arrangement, 2000–12 533
17.5. Evolution of GDP Surrounding IMF Financing, 2000–13 534
17.6. The Growth Impact of IMF Financial Arrangement in Low-Capacity
Countries 535
17.7. Evolution of Official Development Assistance Inflows Surrounding IMF
Arrangement, 2000–12 537

18.1. Prior Actions and Quantitative Performance Options 551
18.2. Structural Conditionality 553
18.3. Catalytic Role of the IMF 555
18.4. Program Success 558
18.5. Concessional Financing: Performance in Five Core Indicators
(Percent of Total) 559
18.6. Completion of Reviews: 61 Programs over 2010–19 560
18.7. Completion of Review: 53 Programs Excluding Civil Conflicts and Coups 560
19.1. Measures of Governance, 2017 574
(Country Ranking out of 210, Outside Indicates Worse Outcomes)
19.2. Volatility of Oil Revenues: Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, 2010–18 576
(Value of Oil Exports, US$ Billions, Base Year 2010 = 100)
19.3. Importance of Oil: Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, 2014 577
(GDP, Exports, and Tax Revenues; Percent Share)
19.4. Death and Displacement 578
19.5. Unemployment Rate, 2018 (Percent of Labor Force) 581
19.6. Government Revenues, Conflict Countries 2010 versus 2017 582
(Percent of GDP)
19.7. Pressure on Government Spending 583
19.8. Fiscal Balance: Iraq, Somalia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen, 2010–18
(Excludes Grants; Percent of GDP) 584
19.9. Fiscal Balance: Libya, 2010–18 (Excludes Grants; Percent of GDP) 585
19.10. Refugees and Asylum Seekers as of 2017 (Width of the Band Represents
Number of Refugees) 587
20.1. The “Fragility Trap” 601
20.2. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Index (0–6) 606
20.3. Inflation (Percent) 609
20.4. Real GDP per Capita (2011 PPP International Dollars) 610
20.5. Technical Assistance Delivery (Person-Years) 612
20.6. Total Revenues Excluding Grants (Percent of GDP) 613
20.7. Grants (Percent of GDP) 614
20.8. Total Public Debt (Percent of GDP) 615
20.9. Public Investment (Percent of GDP) 617
20.10. Domestically Financed Capital Expenditure (Percent of GDP) 618
20.11. Regulatory Quality (Percentile Rank) 619
20.12. Rule of Law (Percentile Rank) 619
20.13. Private Investment (Percent of GDP) 620

20.14. Security Apparatus (Index, 1 = Lowest Threat to 10 = Highest Threat) 621
20.15. Political Stability (Percentile Rank) 621
20.16. Voice and Accountability (Percentile Rank) 622
20.17. Control of Corruption (Percentile Rank) 622
20.18. Factors in Building Resilience 625