摘要翻译：
提出了异质种群下进化动力学的一般框架。该框架允许多种类型的异构Agent，支付函数和修改协议的异构性，以及策略和类型的整体联合分布来影响Agent的支付。我们阐明了解轨迹唯一存在的正则性条件和平衡点存在的正则性条件。我们将一般均衡平稳性和势博弈均衡稳定性从齐次情形推广到异次情形。特别地，一类广泛的可容许动力学通过势的局部极大化在势博弈中共享相同的局部稳定平衡点集。
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英文标题：
《Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework
  for an arbitrary type distribution》
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作者：
Dai Zusai
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  A general framework of evolutionary dynamics under heterogeneous populations is presented. The framework allows continuously many types of heterogeneous agents, heterogeneity both in payoff functions and in revision protocols and the entire joint distribution of strategies and types to influence the payoffs of agents. We clarify regularity conditions for the unique existence of a solution trajectory and for the existence of equilibrium. We confirm that equilibrium stationarity in general and equilibrium stability in potential games are extended from the homogeneous setting to the heterogeneous setting. In particular, a wide class of admissible dynamics share the same set of locally stable equilibria in a potential game through local maximization of the potential.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.04897