摘要翻译：
我们研究经验均衡的基础，这是纳什均衡的一种改进，它基于博弈中行为经验分布的非参数刻画（Velez and Brown,2020b arxiv:1907.12408)。精化也可以被定义为那些不反驳Goeree、Holt和Palfrey(2005)正则QRE理论的纳什均衡。相比之下，一些经验均衡可以驳斥单调加性随机扰动收益模型。作为副产品，我们通过单调加性随机扰动收益模型证明了经验均衡与基于近似的精化不一致，从而进一步理解了这些模型的经验内容。
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英文标题：
《Empirical Equilibrium》
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作者：
Rodrigo A. Velez and Alexander L. Brown
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Econometrics        计量经济学
分类描述：Econometric Theory, Micro-Econometrics, Macro-Econometrics, Empirical Content of Economic Relations discovered via New Methods, Methodological Aspects of the Application of Statistical Inference to Economic Data.
计量经济学理论，微观计量经济学，宏观计量经济学，通过新方法发现的经济关系的实证内容，统计推论应用于经济数据的方法论方面。
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英文摘要：
  We study the foundations of empirical equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium that is based on a non-parametric characterization of empirical distributions of behavior in games (Velez and Brown,2020b arXiv:1907.12408). The refinement can be alternatively defined as those Nash equilibria that do not refute the regular QRE theory of Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2005). By contrast, some empirical equilibria may refute monotone additive randomly disturbed payoff models. As a by product, we show that empirical equilibrium does not coincide with refinements based on approximation by monotone additive randomly disturbed payoff models, and further our understanding of the empirical content of these models.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.07986