摘要翻译：
新闻效用是指代理人的效用取决于她对消费和金钱的信念的变化。我们将新闻效用引入到经典的静态贝叶斯机制设计模型中。我们发现机制的时间轴起着关键作用，即机制的宣布阶段、参与阶段、发挥阶段和实现阶段之间是否存在延迟。根据时机的不同，具有新闻效用的代理人可以体验到两种额外的新闻效用效应：一种是通过与前机制信念进行比较而产生的意外效应，另一种是通过将后机制信念与机制实际结果进行比较而产生的实现效应。我们看两个不同的机构设计设置，反映了古典文学的两个主要部分。在第一个模型中，垄断者根据代理人对损失的厌恶程度来筛选代理人。在第二个模型中，我们考虑了一个一般的多Agent贝叶斯机制设计环境，其中每个参与者的不确定性源于不知道其他Agent的内在类型。我们给出了拍卖和公共物品提供的应用，说明了新闻效用是如何改变经典结果的。对于这两个模型，我们都描述了时间线的最优设计。在参与和游戏之间没有延迟，但在实现上有延迟的时间表在任何一个模型中都不是最佳的。在筛选模型中，最优的时间线是一个没有延迟的时间线。在拍卖环境中，在相当自然的假设下，最优时间线在机制的所有三个阶段之间都有延迟。
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英文标题：
《Mechanism Design with News Utility》
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作者：
Jetlir Duraj
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  News utility is the idea that the utility of an agent depends on changes in her beliefs over consumption and money. We introduce news utility into otherwise classical static Bayesian mechanism design models. We show that a key role is played by the timeline of the mechanism, i.e. whether there are delays between the announcement stage, the participation stage, the play stage and the realization stage of a mechanism. Depending on the timing, agents with news utility can experience two additional news utility effects: a surprise effect derived from comparing to pre-mechanism beliefs, as well as a realization effect derived from comparing post-play beliefs with the actual outcome of the mechanism.   We look at two distinct mechanism design settings reflecting the two main strands of the classical literature. In the first model, a monopolist screens an agent according to the magnitude of her loss aversion. In the second model, we consider a general multi-agent Bayesian mechanism design setting where the uncertainty of each player stems from not knowing the intrinsic types of the other agents. We give applications to auctions and public good provision which illustrate how news utility changes classical results.   For both models we characterize the optimal design of the timeline. A timeline featuring no delay between participation and play but a delay in realization is never optimal in either model. In the screening model the optimal timeline is one without delays. In auction settings, under fairly natural assumptions the optimal timeline has delays between all three stages of the mechanism.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.04020