摘要翻译：
流行病应对是一件复杂的事情。大多数政府采用一套准标准措施来对抗新冠肺炎，包括戴口罩、社交距离、病毒检测和接触者追踪。我们认为，这些措施的不同效力背后的一些非琐碎因素是自私的决策和各国对反应机制的不同执行。在本文中，通过简单的游戏，我们展示了个人激励对戴口罩和社交距离决策的影响，以及这些可能如何导致次优结果。我们还表明了国家当局在正确设计这些游戏时所选择的政策及其对首选结果的影响方面的责任。我们提倡一种机制设计方法：在实施各自的流行病应对机制时，谨慎地平衡社会利益和应对成本，符合每个政府的最佳利益。
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英文标题：
《Corona Games: Masks, Social Distancing and Mechanism Design》
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作者：
Balazs Pejo, Gergely Biczok
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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英文摘要：
  Pandemic response is a complex affair. Most governments employ a set of quasi-standard measures to fight COVID-19 including wearing masks, social distancing, virus testing and contact tracing. We argue that some non-trivial factors behind the varying effectiveness of these measures are selfish decision-making and the differing national implementations of the response mechanism. In this paper, through simple games, we show the effect of individual incentives on the decisions made with respect to wearing masks and social distancing, and how these may result in a sub-optimal outcome. We also demonstrate the responsibility of national authorities in designing these games properly regarding the chosen policies and their influence on the preferred outcome. We promote a mechanism design approach: it is in the best interest of every government to carefully balance social good and response costs when implementing their respective pandemic response mechanism.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.06674