摘要翻译：
本文采用稳健设计方法研究垄断企业的管制问题。我们求解最小化监管者最坏情况后悔的策略，其中后悔是他的完全信息收益减去他的已实现收益之间的差。当监管者的回报是消费者的剩余时，实施价格上限是最优的。最优上限平衡了消费者更多剩余带来的利益和生产不足带来的损失。当他的回报是消费者的剩余加上公司的利润时，他提供计件工资补贴，以缓解生产不足，但对补贴总额设置上限，以免激励严重的生产过剩。
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英文标题：
《Robust Monopoly Regulation》
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作者：
Yingni Guo and Eran Shmaya
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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英文摘要：
  We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm using a robust-design approach. We solve for the policy that minimizes the regulator's worst-case regret, where the regret is the difference between his complete-information payoff minus his realized payoff. When the regulator's payoff is consumers' surplus, it is optimal to impose a price cap. The optimal cap balances the benefit from more surplus for consumers and the loss from underproduction. When his payoff is consumers' surplus plus the firm's profit, he offers a piece-rate subsidy in order to mitigate underproduction, but caps the total subsidy so as not to incentivize severe overproduction.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.04260