摘要翻译：
为了大规模的内容缓存，考虑了一个宽带接入互联网服务提供商(ISP)和多个内容提供商(CP)组成联盟。财团成员分担支持基础设施的业务和投资费用。相应地，模型的成本函数包括边际成本和固定成本；后者在决定产业结构方面起着重要作用。此外，如果网络中立性法规允许，ISP最后一英里的额外网络容量可能由CPS承包。用户的数量取决于用户的价格、需求弹性和体验质量。一个联盟在定价和设计优化后产生的利润决定了博弈的特征函数。联盟的形成是由Okada(1996)提出的一个讨价还价过程，基于非合作的多人博弈框架中的随机提议者。得出了大联盟形成的充要条件，即从大到小的出资国的补贴范围。即使在网络中立性规则下，也通常支持缓存。大联盟的利润符合上限。数值结果验证了分析结果。
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英文标题：
《The Case for Formation of ISP-Content Providers Consortiums by Nash
  Bargaining for Internet Content Delivery》
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作者：
Debasis Mitra, Abhinav Sridhar
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  The formation of consortiums of a broadband access Internet Service Provider (ISP) and multiple Content Providers (CP) is considered for large-scale content caching. The consortium members share costs from operations and investments in the supporting infrastructure. Correspondingly, the model's cost function includes marginal and fixed costs; the latter has been important in determining industry structure. Also, if Net Neutrality regulations permit, additional network capacity on the ISP's last mile may be contracted by the CPs. The number of subscribers is determined by a combination of users' price elasticity of demand and Quality of Experience. The profit generated by a coalition after pricing and design optimization determines the game's characteristic function. Coalition formation is by a bargaining procedure due to Okada (1996) based on random proposers in a non-cooperative, multi-player game-theoretic framework. A necessary and sufficient condition is obtained for the Grand Coalition to form, which bounds subsidies from large to small contributors. Caching is generally supported even under Net Neutrality regulations. The Grand Coalition's profit matches upper bounds. Numerical results illustrate the analytic results.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1810.10660