摘要翻译：
本文考察了当发送者付出努力并随着时间的推移获得利益时的信号。接收者只观察到一个关于努力的嘈杂的公共信号，没有内在价值。动态背景下的信号建模产生了新的平衡结果。在某些均衡中，一个努力成本较高的发件人比低成本的发件人付出更多的努力。低成本类型可以在以后补偿最初的低努力，但这对高成本类型来说是不值得的。对给定信号的解释随着时间的推移而内在地切换，这取决于接收者期望发送的类型。JEL分类:D82、D83、C73。关键词：动态博弈，信号传递，不完全信息
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英文标题：
《Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switching efforts》
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作者：
Sander Heinsalu
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最新提交年份：
2017
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分类信息：

一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  This paper examines signalling when the sender exerts effort and receives benefits over time. Receivers only observe a noisy public signal about the effort, which has no intrinsic value.   The modelling of signalling in a dynamic context gives rise to novel equilibrium outcomes. In some equilibria, a sender with a higher cost of effort exerts strictly more effort than his low-cost counterpart. The low-cost type can compensate later for initial low effort, but this is not worthwhile for a high-cost type. The interpretation of a given signal switches endogenously over time, depending on which type the receivers expect to send it.   JEL classification: D82, D83, C73.   Keywords: Dynamic games, signalling , incomplete information
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.04699