摘要翻译：
我们分析了评估投票，一种新的两轮投票程序，可以应用于民主社会的二元决策。在第一轮选举中，随机挑选的一些公民对手头的两个备选方案中的一个投了票，从而不可撤销地行使了他们的投票权。在第二轮，第一轮结果公布后，剩下的公民决定是投票给另一个选择还是AB染色。两轮的选票被汇总，最后的结果是通过应用多数规则获得的，通过公平的随机分组打破平局。在一个高成本的投票框架内，我们证明了大的选举人会选择具有高问题能力的多数人的首选方案，并且平均成本将是低的。这一结果与关于一轮投票的文献形成鲜明对比，该文献预测要么投票成本较高（当投票是强制性的），要么决定往往不代表大多数人的偏好（当投票是自愿的）。
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英文标题：
《Assessment Voting in Large Electorates》
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作者：
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Oriol Tejada
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Econometrics        计量经济学
分类描述：Econometric Theory, Micro-Econometrics, Macro-Econometrics, Empirical Content of Economic Relations discovered via New Methods, Methodological Aspects of the Application of Statistical Inference to Economic Data.
计量经济学理论，微观计量经济学，宏观计量经济学，通过新方法发现的经济关系的实证内容，统计推论应用于经济数据的方法论方面。
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一级分类：Mathematics        数学
二级分类：Probability        概率
分类描述：Theory and applications of probability and stochastic processes: e.g. central limit theorems, large deviations, stochastic differential equations, models from statistical mechanics, queuing theory
概率论与随机过程的理论与应用：例如中心极限定理，大偏差，随机微分方程，统计力学模型，排队论
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英文摘要：
  We analyze Assessment Voting, a new two-round voting procedure that can be applied to binary decisions in democratic societies. In the first round, a randomly-selected number of citizens cast their vote on one of the two alternatives at hand, thereby irrevocably exercising their right to vote. In the second round, after the results of the first round have been published, the remaining citizens decide whether to vote for one alternative or to ab- stain. The votes from both rounds are aggregated, and the final outcome is obtained by applying the majority rule, with ties being broken by fair randomization. Within a costly voting framework, we show that large elec- torates will choose the preferred alternative of the majority with high prob- ability, and that average costs will be low. This result is in contrast with the literature on one-round voting, which predicts either higher voting costs (when voting is compulsory) or decisions that often do not represent the preferences of the majority (when voting is voluntary).
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.05470