摘要翻译:
发展经济学的中心问题是如何解释经济绩效的全球分布的总差异,以及这种分布的持久性,即经济绩效的总差异。道格拉斯·诺斯(Douglass North)以警句的方式认为,制度,$\cal{I}$,是游戏规则,这意味着$\cal{I}$决定或至少约束$\cal{E}$。这可以解释$\cal{D}$。65000次引用后,中心问题仍未解决。北方的机构是非正式的,慢慢改变着文化规范,道路、行会和正式立法可能会在一夜之间改变。这个混合了静态和动态的定义不适用于发展中经济的必然依赖于时间的理论。我们在这里提供了一个适当精确的$cal{I}$的定义,一个经济发展的动态理论,一个新的经济度量,一个解释$cal{P}$的二元模型,解释了$cal{D}$的一半,并对诺思的警句进行了批判性的重新考虑。
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英文标题:
《Economic Performance Through Time: A Dynamical Theory》
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作者:
Daniel Seligson and Anne McCants
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最新提交年份:
2019
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:General Economics 一般经济学
分类描述:General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类:Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类:Economics 经济学
分类描述:q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学,包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要:
The central problems of Development Economics are the explanation of the gross disparities in the global distribution, $\cal{D}$, of economic performance, $\cal{E}$, and the persistence, $\cal{P}$, of said distribution. Douglass North argued, epigrammatically, that institutions, $\cal{I}$, are the rules of the game, meaning that $\cal{I}$ determines or at least constrains $\cal{E}$. This promised to explain $\cal{D}$. 65,000 citations later, the central problems remain unsolved. North's institutions are informal, slowly changing cultural norms as well as roads, guilds, and formal legislation that may change overnight. This definition, mixing the static and the dynamic, is unsuited for use in a necessarily time dependent theory of developing economies. We offer here a suitably precise definition of $\cal{I}$, a dynamical theory of economic development, a new measure of the economy, an explanation of $\cal{P}$, a bivariate model that explains half of $\cal{D}$, and a critical reconsideration of North's epigram.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.02956