摘要翻译：
考虑一个在在线平台上销售的应用程序，该应用程序支付佣金，从今以后，该应用程序将在该平台上出售。销售应用程序的能力取决于其客户排名。因此，开发人员可能会有动机以不诚实的方式提升他们的应用程序排名。其中一种方法是伪造正面的客户评价。然而，该平台能够以一定的概率检测出不诚实的行为（欺骗），然后决定是否禁止该应用程序。分析了应用开发者（是否作弊）和平台（佣金的设置）的均衡行为。我们提供了平台检测准确性如何影响应用程序开发人员的激励的初步见解。
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英文标题：
《Cheating in Ranking Systems》
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作者：
Lihi Dery, Dror Hermel, Artyom Jelnov
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computers and Society        计算机与社会
分类描述：Covers impact of computers on society, computer ethics, information technology and public policy, legal aspects of computing, computers and education. Roughly includes material in ACM Subject Classes K.0, K.2, K.3, K.4, K.5, and K.7.
涵盖计算机对社会的影响、计算机伦理、信息技术和公共政策、计算机的法律方面、计算机和教育。大致包括ACM学科类K.0、K.2、K.3、K.4、K.5和K.7中的材料。
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英文摘要：
  Consider an application sold on an on-line platform, with the app paying a commission fee and, henceforth, offered for sale on the platform. The ability to sell the application depends on its customer ranking. Therefore, developers may have an incentive to promote their applications ranking in a dishonest manner. One way to do this is by faking positive customer reviews. However, the platform is able to detect dishonest behavior (cheating) with some probability and then proceeds to decide whether to ban the application. We provide an analysis and find the equilibrium behaviors of both the applications developers (cheat or not) and the platform (setting of the commission fee). We provide initial insights into how the platforms detection accuracy affects the incentives of the app developers.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.09116