摘要翻译：
在这篇文章中，我通过博弈论的方法来澄清增值税逃税的诱因。传统上，逃税与收入较高时的风险厌恶下降有关（Allingham and Sandmo(1972)，Cowell(1985)(1990))。我声称逃税是一个理性的选择，即使在没有控制和制裁的情况下，遵守也比逃避成本高。我创建了一个框架，能够衡量纳税人遵守的激励措施。这里的激励措施是从所得税中扣除特定的增值税记录费用。这个问题是众所周知的，许多国家都有扣减政策。其目的是为每个精确的纳税人类别计算正确的参数。逃税是交易双方的串通行为。因此，我首先探讨这两个私人对应方同意联合逃税并组成联盟的便利性。至关重要的是，合规激励破坏了交易参与者联盟之间关于规避的协议。博弈解决方案导致边际税率或扣除百分比的界限，取决于参数，能够产生遵守增值税政策的激励措施。这里提出的增值税政策的程式化例子已经在许多国家使用，它试图为税收设计建立一种更通用的方法，能够使遵守成为“主导战略”，满足逃税所代表的“外部选择”约束，即使在没有审计和制裁的情况下也是如此。本文所导出的理论结果可以很容易地应用于实际数据，以进行精确的税收设计工程。
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英文标题：
《VAT Compliance Incentives》
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作者：
Maria-Augusta Miceli
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  In this work I clarify VAT evasion incentives through a game theoretical approach. Traditionally, evasion has been linked to the decreasing risk aversion in higher revenues (Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Cowell (1985) (1990)). I claim tax evasion to be a rational choice when compliance is stochastically more expensive than evading, even in absence of controls and sanctions. I create a framework able to measure the incentives for taxpayers to comply. The incentives here are deductions of specific VAT documented expenses from the income tax. The issue is very well known and deduction policies at work in many countries. The aim is to compute the right parameters for each precise class of taxpayers. VAT evasion is a collusive conduct between the two counterparts of the transaction. I therefore first explore the convenience for the two private counterparts to agree on the joint evasion and to form a coalition. Crucial is that compliance incentives break the agreement among the transaction participants' coalition about evading. The game solution leads to boundaries for marginal tax rates or deduction percentages, depending on parameters, able to create incentives to comply The stylized example presented here for VAT policies, already in use in many countries, is an attempt to establish a more general method for tax design, able to make compliance the "dominant strategy", satisfying the "outside option" constraint represented by evasion, even in absence of audit and sanctions. The theoretical results derived here can be easily applied to real data for precise tax design engineering.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.07862