摘要翻译：
我们发展了一个框架，在这个框架中，个人的偏好与他们欺骗他人的偏好和意图的能力共同进化。具体地说，个体的特征是(i)认知复杂程度和(ii)主观效用函数。认知的增加是昂贵的，但在一些比赛中，较高水平的个人有优势能够欺骗较低水平的对手关于他们的偏好和意图。在剩余的匹配中，个体观察对方的偏好。我们的主要结果表明，本质上，只有有效的结果才是稳定的。此外，在附加的温和假设下，我们证明了有效结果是稳定的当且仅当单边偏差的收益小于环境中的有效欺骗成本。
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英文标题：
《Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet
  Machiavelli》
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作者：
Yuval Heller and Erik Mohlin
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We develop a framework in which individuals' preferences coevolve with their abilities to deceive others about their preferences and intentions. Specifically, individuals are characterised by (i) a level of cognitive sophistication and (ii) a subjective utility function. Increased cognition is costly, but higher-level individuals have the advantage of being able to deceive lower-level opponents about their preferences and intentions in some of the matches. In the remaining matches, the individuals observe each other's preferences. Our main result shows that, essentially, only efficient outcomes can be stable. Moreover, under additional mild assumptions, we show that an efficient outcome is stable if and only if the gain from unilateral deviation is smaller than the effective cost of deception in the environment.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.15308