摘要翻译：
最近，一些交通服务提供商试图整合多个独立的搭车平台提供的搭车服务，乘客可以通过这些第三方集成商或连接器请求搭车，并从任何一个平台接受服务。这种新型的商业模式，本文称之为第三方平台整合，具有缓解多个平台间需求分裂所带来的市场分割成本的潜力。现有的研究大多集中在单个垄断平台的运营策略上，而对竞争和平台整合对运营策略和系统效率的影响则知之甚少。在本文中，我们提出了描述具有多个竞争平台的搭车采购市场的数学模型，并在纳什均衡和社会最优下比较了有平台整合和无平台整合两种市场情形下的系统性能指标。我们发现，在纳什均衡和社会最优条件下，平台整合可以增加总的实现需求和社会福利，但在汽车供给足够大或/和市场过于分散的情况下，平台整合不一定会产生更大的利润。结果表明，平台整合的市场总体上获得了更大的社会福利。一方面，平台整合中的集成商能够创造更大的市场，减少匹配摩擦；另一方面，多个平台仍在通过独立定价进行竞争，这有助于缓解垄断市场中的垄断加价。
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英文标题：
《Competitive ride-sourcing market with a third-party integrator》
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作者：
Yaqian Zhou, Hai Yang, Jintao Ke, Hai Wang, Xinwei Li
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  Recently, some transportation service providers attempt to integrate the ride services offered by multiple independent ride-sourcing platforms, and passengers are able to request ride through such third-party integrators or connectors and receive service from any one of the platforms. This novel business model, termed as third-party platform-integration in this paper, has potentials to alleviate the cost of market fragmentation due to the demand splitting among multiple platforms. While most existing studies focus on the operation strategies for one single monopolist platform, much less is known about the competition and platform-integration as well as the implications on operation strategy and system efficiency. In this paper, we propose mathematical models to describe the ride-sourcing market with multiple competing platforms and compare system performance metrics between two market scenarios, i.e., with and without platform-integration, at Nash equilibrium as well as social optimum. We find that platform-integration can increase total realized demand and social welfare at both Nash equilibrium and social optimum, but may not necessarily generate a greater profit when vehicle supply is sufficiently large or/and market is too fragmented. We show that the market with platform-integration generally achieves greater social welfare. On one hand, the integrator in platform-integration is able to generate a thicker market and reduce matching frictions; on the other hand, multiple platforms are still competing by independently setting their prices, which help to mitigate monopoly mark-up as in the monopoly market.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2008.09815