摘要翻译：
Gale、Kuhn和Tucker(1950)提出了两种方法，通过将一些策略与它们的概率分布相结合来减少零和博弈。就价值而言，他们给出了可取的降价条件。我们证明了期望减少的概率分布依赖于原始博弈中的最优策略。此外，我们还纠正了他们给出的一个不适当的例子，以表明一个定理的反向不成立。
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英文标题：
《A Note on Gale, Kuhn, and Tucker's Reductions of Zero-Sum Games》
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作者：
Shuige Liu
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最新提交年份：
2017
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Econometrics        计量经济学
分类描述：Econometric Theory, Micro-Econometrics, Macro-Econometrics, Empirical Content of Economic Relations discovered via New Methods, Methodological Aspects of the Application of Statistical Inference to Economic Data.
计量经济学理论，微观计量经济学，宏观计量经济学，通过新方法发现的经济关系的实证内容，统计推论应用于经济数据的方法论方面。
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英文摘要：
  Gale, Kuhn and Tucker (1950) introduced two ways to reduce a zero-sum game by packaging some strategies with respect to a probability distribution on them. In terms of value, they gave conditions for a desirable reduction. We show that a probability distribution for a desirable reduction relies on optimal strategies in the original game. Also, we correct an improper example given by them to show that the reverse of a theorem does not hold.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.02326