摘要翻译：
我们研究了真实信息和虚假信息（谣言）在社交网络中的传播。当听到一个消息时，个人可能会相信它，不相信它，或者通过昂贵的验证来揭穿它。每当真相以稳定的状态存在时，谣言也是如此。网络社交只要增加了验证成本，就会加剧相对谣言的流行，而同源性的影响取决于确切的验证过程。我们的模型强调，打击谣言的成功政策增加了个人核实的动机。
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英文标题：
《Debunking Rumors in Networks》
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作者：
Luca P. Merlino and Paolo Pin and Nicole Tabasso
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Physics        物理学
二级分类：Physics and Society        物理学与社会
分类描述：Structure, dynamics and collective behavior of societies and groups (human or otherwise). Quantitative analysis of social networks and other complex networks. Physics and engineering of infrastructure and systems of broad societal impact (e.g., energy grids, transportation networks).
社会和团体（人类或其他）的结构、动态和集体行为。社会网络和其他复杂网络的定量分析。具有广泛社会影响的基础设施和系统（如能源网、运输网络）的物理和工程。
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英文摘要：
  We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (the rumor) in a social network. Upon hearing a message, individuals may believe it, disbelieve it, or debunk it through costly verification. Whenever the truth survives in steady state, so does the rumor. Online social communication exacerbates relative rumor prevalence as long as it increases verification costs, while the impact of homophily depends on the exact verification process. Our model highlights that successful policies in the fight against rumors increase individuals' incentives to verify.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2010.01018