摘要翻译：
我们提供工具来分析受约束的信息设计问题。我们通过表明Le Treust和Tomala(2019)中的技术扩展到多重不等式和等式约束的情况来做到这一点。这说明了本文的结果对于分析受约束的信息设计问题的力量。我们用有限承诺机制设计（Doval and Skreta，2020)和私人知情接受者的说服（Kolotilin et al.，2017)的应用来说明我们的结果。
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英文标题：
《Constrained Information Design》
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作者：
Laura Doval and Vasiliki Skreta
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We provide tools to analyze information design problems subject to constraints. We do so by showing that the techniques in Le Treust and Tomala (2019) extend to the case of multiple inequality and equality constraints. This showcases the power of the results in that paper to analyze problems of information design subject to constraints. We illustrate our results with applications to mechanism design with limited commitment (Doval and Skreta, 2020) and persuasion of a privately informed receiver (Kolotilin et al., 2017).
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.03588