摘要翻译：
本文研究的是存在负外部性的河流沿岸两个代理人之间的河流共享问题。在这种情况下，每个代理人根据领土的水文特征要求河水。这些权利主张可以用一些国际权利框架（原则）来描述。在存在负外部性的情况下，这些国际原则在其他行为者看来是不公平的。谈判达成的条约涉及分享水资源以及上游代理人对下游代理人施加的负面外部影响问题。基于市场的讨价还价机制被用来建模和表征协议点。
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英文标题：
《A Bilateral River Bargaining Problem with Negative Externality》
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作者：
Shivshanker Singh Patel, Parthasarathy Ramachandran
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  This article is addressing the problem of river sharing between two agents along a river in the presence of negative externalities. Where, each agent claims river water based on the hydrological characteristics of the territories. The claims can be characterized by some international framework (principles) of entitlement. These international principles are appears to be inequitable by the other agents in the presence of negative externalities. The negotiated treaties address sharing water along with the issue of negative externalities imposed by the upstream agent on the downstream agents. The market based bargaining mechanism is used for modeling and for characterization of agreement points.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.05844