摘要翻译：
在本文中，我实证研究了政治机构对不同代表性的开放如何影响与冲突有关的暴力。通过利用哥伦比亚市政当局议员人数的看似外生的变化，我得出了两组结果。首先，回归不连续性估计表明，较大的市议会有更多的政党，至少有一名民选代表。我把这个结果解释为较大的市政局对不同政治参与更为开放的证据。估计数还显示，非传统政党是这种更大政治开放的主要受益者。第二，回归不连续性估计数表明，政治开放大大减少了与冲突有关的暴力，即杀害平民非战斗人员。通过利用地方选举结果中看似外生的差异，我表明，政治暴力程度较低的原因是与武装团体有密切联系的政党更多地参与。我利用关于这些团体所使用的暴力类型以及在政府较高级别任职的数据，认为武装暴力有所减少，并不是因为与政治代表性较大的政党有联系的武装团体的权力分享安排，而是因为政治权力和知名度较低的武装团体被阻止发动某些类型的暴力。
---
英文标题：
《Political Openness and Armed Conflict: Evidence from Local Councils in
  Colombia》
---
作者：
Hector Galindo-Silva
---
最新提交年份：
2020
---
分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
--
一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
--

---
英文摘要：
  In this paper, I empirically investigate how the openness of political institutions to diverse representation can impact conflict-related violence. By exploiting plausibly exogenous variations in the number of councillors in Colombian municipalities, I develop two sets of results. First, regression discontinuity estimates show that larger municipal councils have a considerably greater number of political parties with at least one elected representative. I interpret this result as evidence that larger municipal councils are more open to diverse political participation. The estimates also reveal that non-traditional parties are the main beneficiaries of this greater political openness. Second, regression discontinuity estimates show that political openness substantially decreases conflict-related violence, namely the killing of civilian non-combatants. By exploiting plausibly exogenous variations in local election results, I show that the lower level of political violence stems from greater participation by parties with close links to armed groups. Using data about the types of violence employed by these groups, and representation at higher levels of government, I argue that armed violence has decreased not because of power-sharing arrangements involving armed groups linked to the parties with more political representation, but rather because armed groups with less political power and visibility are deterred from initiating certain types of violence.
---
PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.03712