摘要翻译：
我们研究了一个卖给多个投标者的单一商品的销售者，在投标者估价的联合分布以及投标者对其对手的高阶信念不确定的情况下。卖方只知道每个投标人估价的边际分布的平均值和范围，在这个模糊集合中，一种对抗性质选择最坏的情况分布。我们发现，具有最优随机保留价格的二级价格拍卖在包含所有标准拍卖格式的广泛机制中获得最优收益保证。我们发现，随着投标者数量的增加，卖方的最优底价在概率上收敛于一个非约束底价。
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英文标题：
《Distributionally Robust Optimal Auction Design under Mean Constraints》
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作者：
Ethan Che
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the mean of the marginal distribution of each bidder's valuation and the range, and an adversarial nature chooses the worst-case distribution within this ambiguity set. We find that a second-price auction with an optimal, random reserve price obtains the optimal revenue guarantee within a broad class of mechanisms that include all the standard auction formats. We find that as the number of bidders grows large, the seller's optimal reserve price converges in probability to a non-binding reserve price.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1911.07103