摘要翻译：
我们通过序列的功利福利最大化刻画了Pareto最优性：效用向量u是Pareto最优当且仅当存在一个有限的非负（最终为正）福利权重序列，使得$u$在前一个最大值集合中的每一个连续福利权重使功利福利最大化。该特征可以进一步与分段线性凹社会福利函数的最大化和代理之间的顺序讨价还价&广义纳什讨价还价联系起来。我们提供了条件，使更简单的功利主义特征和第二种福利的一个版本
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英文标题：
《Characterizing Pareto Optima: Sequential Utilitarian Welfare
  Maximization》
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作者：
Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Fuhito Kojima, Christopher Thomas Ryan
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We characterize Pareto optimality via sequential utilitarian welfare maximization: a utility vector u is Pareto optimal if and only if there exists a finite sequence of nonnegative (and eventually positive) welfare weights such that $u$ maximizes utilitarian welfare with each successive welfare weights among the previous set of maximizers. The characterization can be further related to maximization of a piecewise-linear concave social welfare function and sequential bargaining among agents a la generalized Nash bargaining. We provide conditions enabling simpler utilitarian characterizations and a version of the second welfare
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2008.10819