摘要翻译：
本文研究了解决地方公共物品供给不公平问题的政治可行的政策方案。我特别关注美国普遍存在的高财产税、地区收入差距和公共教育不平等等交织在一起的问题。人们早就认识到，由于人口流动，地方管理和学校资金导致地区之间的竞争。通过解释收入和家庭质量的异质性，我能够对这一现象给予新的解释，并提出新的政策建议。我在一个具有竞争性住房市场、财富水平和家庭质量异质性以及战略性地区政府的区位选择和教育投资的动态一般均衡模型中刻画了均衡。当所有房屋都是业主自住时，我指出战略地区之间的竞争会导致过度征税，以吸引更富裕的居民。对较富裕地区的支出进行上限和/或征税的一个简单的政策类别是帕累托改进，因此在政治上是可行的。这些政策减少了受教育机会的不平等，同时增加了供资不足学校的支出。这些收益是由于较富裕地区过度支出产生的负外部性得到缓解而产生的。我还讨论了住房拥有程度的政策含义。该模型为观察到的住房所有权、地点选择和收入模式提供了新的线索。最后，我利用回归不连续性设计和马萨诸塞州的财产税公投数据对假设和含义进行了实证检验。
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英文标题：
《Redistribution Through Tax Relief》
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作者：
Quitz\\\'e Valenzuela-Stookey
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  This paper studies politically feasible policy solutions to inequities in local public goods provision. I focus in particular on the entwined issues of high property taxes, geographic income disparities, and inequalities in public education prevalent in the United States. It has long been recognized that with a mobile population, local administration and funding of schools leads to competition between districts. By accounting for heterogeneity in incomes and home qualities, I am able to shed new light on this phenomenon, and make novel policy recommendations. I characterize the equilibrium in a dynamic general equilibrium model of location choice and education investment with a competitive housing market, heterogeneous wealth levels and home qualities, and strategic district governments. When all homes are owner-occupied, I show that competition between strategic districts leads to over-taxation in an attempt to attract wealthier residents. A simple class of policies that cap and/or tax the expenditure of richer districts are Pareto improving, and thus politically feasible. These policies reduce inequality in access to education while increasing expenditure for under-funded schools. Gains are driven by mitigation of the negative externalities generated by excessive spending among wealthier districts. I also discuss the policy implications of the degree of homeownership. The model sheds new light on observed patterns of homeownership, location choice, and income. Finally, I test the assumptions and implications empirically using a regression discontinuity design and data on property tax referenda in Massachusetts.
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