英文标题：
《Minority games played by arbitrageurs on the energy market》
---
作者：
Tim Ritmeester and Hildegard Meyer-Ortmanns
---
最新提交年份：
2021
---
英文摘要：
  Along with the energy transition, the energy markets change their organization toward more decentralized and self-organized structures, striving for locally optimal profits. These tendencies may endanger the physical grid stability. One realistic option is the exhaustion of reserve energy due to an abuse by arbitrageurs. We map the energy market to different versions of a minority game and determine the expected amount of arbitrage as well as its fluctuations as a function of the model parameters. Of particular interest are the impact of heterogeneous contributions of arbitrageurs, the interplay between external stochastic events and nonlinear price functions of reserve power, and the effect of risk aversion due to suspected penalties. The non-monotonic dependence of arbitrage on the control parameters reveals an underlying phase transition that is the counterpart to replica symmetry breaking in spin glasses. As conclusions from our results we propose economic and statutory measures to counteract a detrimental effect of arbitrage.
---
中文摘要：
随着能源转型，能源市场的组织结构朝着更加分散和自组织的结构转变，以追求局部最优利润。这些趋势可能会危及电网的物理稳定性。一个现实的选择是由于套利者的滥用而耗尽储备能量。我们将能源市场映射到少数人博弈的不同版本，并确定套利的预期金额及其波动作为模型参数的函数。特别令人感兴趣的是套利者的异质贡献的影响，外部随机事件和储备权力的非线性价格函数之间的相互作用，以及由于疑似惩罚而产生的风险规避效应。套利对控制参数的非单调依赖性揭示了一种潜在的相变，它与自旋玻璃中的复制对称破缺相对应。根据我们的结果，我们提出了经济和法定措施，以抵消套利的不利影响。
---
分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
--

---
PDF下载：
-->