英文标题：
《Antimonopoly regulation method in energy markets based on the
  Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism》
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作者：
Vadim Borokhov
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最新提交年份：
2021
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英文摘要：
  We evaluate the applicability of the generic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism as an antimonopoly measure against a profit-maximizing producer with market power operating a portfolio of generating units at the centralized two-settlement energy market. The producer may indicate in its bid not only the altered cost function but also the distorted values of the technical parameters of its generating units, which enter the system-wide constraints of the centralized dispatch optimization problem. To ensure the applicability of the VCG method in this setting, we identify an additional assumption on the changes of the feasible set of the centralized dispatch optimization problem induced by variations of the producer\'s technical parameters. In the framework of the generic VCG mechanism, we propose an antimonopoly regulation method based on a regulator estimate of the producer\'s truthful bid. If this estimate is exact, the producer\'s maximum profit coincides with that in the case of the truthful bidding when no antimonopoly measure is applied. If the estimate is not exact, the error affects neither the producer\'s (weakly) dominant bid nor its optimal nodal output but manifests itself in the total uplift payment. This ensures an efficient allocation in the form of the optimal output/consumption schedule and shields the (pre-uplift) market prices from the producer\'s market power. We compare the suggested method with the alternative antimonopoly regulation approach based on the replacement of the producer\'s bid by a bid composed by the regulator.
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中文摘要：
我们评估了Vickrey Clarke Groves（VCG）通用机制作为反垄断措施的适用性，该机制针对的是一家利润最大化的生产商，该生产商拥有市场力量，在集中的两结算能源市场上运营发电机组组合。发电商在投标书中不仅可以指出变更后的成本函数，还可以指出其发电机组技术参数的扭曲值，这些参数进入了集中调度优化问题的全系统约束。为了确保VCG方法在这种情况下的适用性，我们确定了一个额外的假设，即由于生产商技术参数的变化而导致的集中调度优化问题可行集的变化。在一般VCG机制的框架下，我们提出了一种基于监管者对生产者真实报价的估计的反垄断监管方法。如果这一估计是准确的，生产者的最大利润与在不采取反垄断措施的情况下真实竞价的最大利润一致。如果估算不准确，误差既不会影响生产商的（弱）主导报价，也不会影响其最优节点输出，而是会在总提升付款中体现出来。这确保了以最优产出/消费计划的形式进行有效分配，并保护（提升前）市场价格不受生产者市场力量的影响。我们将建议的方法与另一种反垄断监管方法进行了比较，后者是以监管机构组成的投标取代生产商的投标。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Mathematics        数学
二级分类：Optimization and Control        优化与控制
分类描述：Operations research, linear programming, control theory, systems theory, optimal control, game theory
运筹学，线性规划，控制论，系统论，最优控制，博弈论
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：General Finance        一般财务
分类描述：Development of general quantitative methodologies with applications in finance
通用定量方法的发展及其在金融中的应用
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