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2011-06-14
Goldman Sachs
Long on chutzpah, short on friends
The firm that came to dominate world finance
Apr 14th 2011 | from the print edition
Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came to Rule the World. By William Cohan. Doubleday; 672 pages; $30.50. Allen Lane; £25. Buy from Amazon.com, Amazon.co.uk
ONCE upon a time, the evening before a long Memorial Day weekend, a senior partner of Goldman Sachs kept 40 new recruits waiting in a conference room for five hours, until 10pm, just to teach them the value of patience. The three who left early, overcome by the urge to begin their holidays, were sacked days later.
Pointless cruelty? Or a simple way to communicate the corporate culture? The paradoxical message of William Cohan’s compelling history of the world’s most envied and—recently at least—most pilloried securities firm is that much of what Goldman does seems to warrant admiration and opprobrium in equal measure. There is no starker example than the role it played in the global credit crisis when it dodged the bullets that floored many rivals, but did so by cashing in on others’ misery and pushing the bounds of ethics.
Related topicsGoldman started out in 1869 as a dealer in commercial paper. As it entered new businesses its culture remained remarkably cohesive, thanks to strong leadership and its eschewal of big acquisitions. It has long been considered the best risk manager on Wall Street. This helps it attract the brightest recruits, some of whom have to endure more than 30 interviews before being offered a job. Goldmanites are expected to work from dawn till night and to value teamwork over individual glory.
But some of the beliefs on which the firm was founded have been eroded, especially since it went public in 1999. Goldman claims to put its clients first; indeed, that is the first of its 14 “business principles”. Yet it was selling them toxic mortgage securities long after it put on the “big short”—a highly lucrative bet against housing in 2006-07 that, as internal e-mails attest, was blessed by Goldman’s top brass.
This trade, a “Houdini act” that netted Goldman $4 billion in profit, has featured in other books about the crisis, such as Gregory Zuckerman’s “The Greatest Trade Ever” (2009) and Michael Lewis’s “The Big Short” (2010). But Mr Cohan provides plenty of fresh material, for instance on the “Kabuki theatre” that was the relationship between John Paulson, a hedge-fund manager who made billions shorting mortgages, and Josh Birnbaum, the Goldman trader behind the “big short”. Mr Birnbaum initially tried to frighten Mr Paulson—a Goldman client—into backing off from his audacious trade, but when the fund manager held firm Mr Birnbaum was persuaded of its merits and began to copy him instead.
The book offers the best analysis yet of Goldman’s increasingly tangled web of conflicts. As its trading businesses have mushroomed—to well beyond the size of its investment bank—clients have become increasingly confused about whether the firm is an agent or a competitor. It is often both. Goldman has pushed this envelope further than other investment banks, believing it had the skill to manage the resulting conflicts. It insists that the Chinese walls separating its traders and bankers are always impermeable.
But outsiders are less inclined to trust it these days. Using client information to increase its trading edge—if that is what Goldman does—may not be against the law, but it is hardly honourable. As the author puts it, the scandal may not be what’s illegal but what’s legal.
Controversy also swirls around Goldman’s “marks”, or the prices at which it valued its mortgage holdings during the crisis. These were much lower than those of its rivals, drawing accusations that it was trying to force them to mark their portfolios down to the same level so that it could pick up assets on the cheap in the ensuing wave of firesales.
Goldman’s aggressive stance certainly caused massive pain, speeding the demise of Bear Stearns and AIG. But as mortgage delinquencies ballooned, Goldman’s marks were shown to be more accurate than those of the other big houses. Its longstanding “mark-to-market” discipline meant it was better placed to face the truth. There is no evidence of a conspiracy to post unreasonably low valuations. There was, in fact, a vigorous debate within Goldman about the right level, just as there was over the firm’s overall risk levels. Angry at being reined in by its powerful risk managers, traders dubbed them the “VAR police”, a reference to the value-at-risk models they used to measure how much was on the line.
Goldmanites feel their firm has been unfairly singled out as a symbol of greed. Some blame that on botched public relations. Goldman has, for instance, shown remarkably little humility for a firm that, for all its risk-management heroics, was almost swept away as the crisis deepened in 2008. (Conversely, it has had to pretend to be dumber than it really was in order to deflect criticism of the “big short”.)
How much lasting damage has all this done to the firm? In its favour, Goldman has a remarkable record of bouncing back from adversity, whether the 1929 crash, near-fatal interest-rate bets in the 1990s or the infighting over its IPO. Friends and foes alike marvel at its skill at analysing market trends and responding quickly.
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2011-6-14 21:01:28
But it is vulnerable. Most clients have stuck with it so far, perhaps fearful that alienating the firm would be bad for business: Goldman is still seen as having unparalleled deal flow. But they are questioning its methods as never before, as are politicians; the latest slaps are in a Senate report released this week. The political connections that earned Goldman the sobriquet Government Sachs have been loosened by the crisis. (Jon Corzine, pictured right above, who was appointed Goldman’s CEO in 1994, was for a while governor of New Jersey and his successor, Henry Paulson, left, went on to become President George Bush’s treasury secretary.) A press that once put Goldman on a pedestal prefers today to put the boot in. The biggest danger, however, lies within. The firm’s DNA may have mutated to the point where it works against all of those worthy principles, particularly client-centricity.
“Money and Power” is a return to form for Mr Cohan, whose last book, about the final days of Bear Stearns, lacked the epic sweep of his prize-winning history of Lazard Frères, “The Last Tycoons” (2007). The writing is crisp and the research meticulous, drawing on reams of documents made publicly available by congressional committees and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. The book has flaws: there is too much on well-trodden events from the distant past, too little on the traumatic weeks after AIG’s bail-out, when Goldman came close to death. And, for all the evidence presented, it fails to provide a definitive answer to the question of whether the firm’s success owes more to its brilliance or to its ability to find all sorts of ways to load the dice. But that might just be because the answer is a bit of both.
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2011-6-15 01:23:01
Is the 36?Follow 2 2
Fortunately, I have read this passage already and got the translation in another website. So here is it~
脸皮厚,朋友少
高盛,一家掌控全球金融的公司
金钱与权力:高盛如此控制世界。(william cohan 著。双日出版社出版,672页,定价为30.50美元。Allen lane 25英镑购自亚马逊)
曾几何时,在美国阵亡将士纪念日前的一个晚上,一位高盛的资深合伙人让40名新雇员在一个会议室一直等了5个小时,直到夜里十点,目的就是要教会他们耐心的价值。其中有三个由于急于开始他们的假期而提前走了,结果几天后被炒了鱿鱼。
毫无意义的残忍?或是传达公司文化的一种简单方式?威廉•科汉这本书中的矛盾重重激起了人们对这个世界上最令人嫉妒的(至少在现在)也是最臭名昭著的证券公司的兴起,高盛做的很多事情似乎毁誉参半。高盛在全球信用危机时所扮演的角色就是最好的例子来描述高盛如何通过落井下石、背信弃义来躲闪那些击倒了很多对手的子弹。
高盛,1869年由一个商业票据的商人的开始起步,由于强有力的领导以及避免作大的并购,当其进入一个新的领域,其文化依旧很有凝聚力。他长期被认为是华尔街的头号风险经理者。而这就帮助他吸引到最聪明的职员,其中许多人在得到这份工作之前不得不忍受超过30次的面试。高盛的员工得起早贪黑的工作,并且把团队的荣誉放在个人的荣誉之前。但是许多公司成立之初定下的信条正在被逐渐的破坏掉,特别是其于1999年上市之后。比如,高盛认为客户第一,确实,它位居高盛十四个商业信条之首。但是,在布阵房地产大空头——有内部消息证实,这是在2006-2007年被高层同意允准的一种极其赚钱的楼市对赌——之后,将有毒住房抵押债券卖给它的客户。

这个让高盛净赚40亿美元的魔术般的交易,在其他类似书上也浓墨重彩。诸如:格雷戈里•朱克曼所著的《最伟大的交易》(2009年出版);迈克尔•路易斯所著的《大空头》(2010年出版)。但是科汉先生提供了非常多新鲜素材,比如:“歌舞剧戏院”这个名词,就是讲述的一个做了十几亿房屋抵押贷款空头的对冲基金经理约翰鲍尔森与一个“大空头”背后的高盛交易商伯恩鲍姆的关系。事情是这样的,伯恩鲍姆先生最初想要恐吓鲍尔森(高盛的一个客户)让其撤回鲁莽的交易,但当这位基金经理固守交易,最后伯恩鲍姆先生竟也被这种交易优点说服并开始复制鲍尔森的做法。

这本书提供了迄今为止对高盛日益复杂的矛盾的最佳分析。随着其交易业务的蓬勃发展,大大超越了其融资部门业务,投资者日益感到困惑,它到底是个代理机构还是一个入场竞争者呢?答案是:常常都是。相对于其他投资银行,高盛在这种结构上走的更远。相信其有技术来应付由此产生的冲突。高盛坚称其企业的“信息隔离墙”能密不透风的隔离其交易部门和融资部门。(注1)

但是许多高盛之外的人如今不是很相信它的话。如果高盛利用客户信息来增加其交易优势可能不会违反法律,(如果这就是高盛的所作所为),但是这个怎么说也是极其不光鲜的。作者写道:(对高盛而言)丑闻可能不是你做了什么非法的事情,而是你做了合法的事情。

争论也围绕着高盛的评级。或者是在信用危机中,其对抵押贷款的定价。在评级与定价方面,相比起对手而言,高盛的定价显得太低了。而这引来很多指责:高盛企图迫使他们标低资产价格到与高盛一样的级别,从而在随后接踵而来的减价出售浪潮中,可以以一个低廉的价格“收割”这些资产。

高盛激进的姿态必然会引发(其他企业)大范围的伤痛,其加速了贝尔斯登(美国的一家投资银行)与AIG的死亡。但是由于住房抵押不良贷款的激增,高盛的评级的确被证明比其他大的房地产企业更加准确。高盛擅长的“给市场定价”意味着最好的选择是面对现实。没有证据说明,发布不合理的低估值是个阴谋。实际上,正如在公司整体风险水平上存在着激烈的争论一样,对于评级是否正确,高盛内部也存在着激烈的争论。高盛的交易部门授予其有强大的风险管理部门“在险价值警察”的称号——他们用一种模型来测量有多少资产处于风险中——意在表达由于受到其抑制业务而气愤不已的心情。

高盛的员工认为他们的公司被单拎出来冠以贪婪典型是不公平的。一些人将此归因于高盛没做好公共关系。例如,在2008年危机加深时,高盛对于一个几乎被冲走的公司表现出极其少的谦逊(相反地,高盛不得不用装傻来转移公众对其大肆做空房地产的批评。)

上述问题对公司带来了什么长远损害?从有利的方面看,高盛有着卓越的从逆境中翻身的记录,不论是1929年的大崩盘,还是90年代近乎致命的利率赌注,或者是其首次公开发行的暗斗。无论是朋友还是敌人都惊叹于其分析市场并快速反应的技术。

但是这也会引来攻击。大多数客户目前还是与高盛保持合作,可能是害怕疏远了这家公司会对其生意不利:高盛依然被看做拥有空前交易流。但是,如同政治家们质疑高盛一样,高盛的客户也前所未有的质疑其公司经营的方式方法。最新的是本周发布的参议院报告,由于与ZF联系紧密让高盛获得了“ZF高盛”的绰号,但受金融危机的影响,这种联系有所放松。(图片右上角的是科尔津,他曾于1994年被指派为高盛的首席执行官,曾执掌新泽西州,她的继任者,亨利鲍尔森,左边,曾担任布什ZF时期美联储主席)一家曾把高盛捧上高座的媒体如今却对其穷追猛打。最大的危险,常常来源于内部。这家公司的基因可能突变,违背了所有那些宝贵的原则,特别是客户第一原则。

《金钱与权力》是一本让科汉先生重登辉煌的书,其上一本著作(文中未给出:应该是指的是house of cards:失控的华尔街、2009年3月10日出版)描述了贝尔斯登最后的日子,另一本《最后的大亨》(2007出版)因缺少对拉扎德投资银行饱受赞誉的历史壮丽描述(而失败)。“金钱与权力”一书文字清晰明了、干净利落,援引了大量素材来让公众了解国会委员和金融危机调查委员会。这本书也有缺陷:文中写了太多年代遥远的陈年旧事,却很少描写AIG获得救助之后,高盛濒临死亡的那两个星期所发生的故事。并且,书中举出的论据,在这家公司的成功到底是因为其员工智慧还是因为使用不正当手段的问题上,没有给读者提供一个确切的答案。但是,可能正是因为两者皆是答案。


注一:信息隔离墙(chinese wall) :融资部与交易部工作人员之间的信息交流受到严格限制,以防范敏感消息外泄,从而构成内部交易。在新华网上有专门介绍这个的一个小视频(5分钟):http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2011-03/04/c_121150217.htm
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