1. Empirical Strategies in Economics: Illuminating thePath From Cause to Effect经济学中的实证策略:厘清从原因到结果的路径

Joshua D. Angrist

Abstract ：The view thatempirical strategies in economics should be transparent and credible now goesalmost without saying.

经济学中的经验策略应该是透明和可信的，这种观点现在几乎不用再强调了。

By revealing forwhom particular instrumental variables (IV) estimates are valid, the localaverage treatment effects (LATE) framework helped make this so.

通过揭示特定的工具变量(IV)估计对谁有效，局部平均处理效应的(LATE)框架有助于实现这一点。

This lectureuses empirical examples, mostly involving effects of charter and exam schoolattendance, to illustrate the value of the LATE framework for causal inference.

本讲座使用实证案例（主要涉及特许学校考试出勤率的影响）来说明因果推断的LATE框架的价值。

LATEdistinguishes independence conditions satisfied by random assignment from morecontroversial exclusion restrictions.

LATE将随机分配应满足的独立条件与更有争议的排除限制区别开来。

A surprisingexclusion restriction is shown to explain why enrollment at Chicago examschools reduces student achievement.

一个令人惊讶的排除限制被证明可以解释为什么芝加哥考试学校的入学考试会降低学生的成绩。

I also make twobroader points: IV exclusion restrictions formalize commitment to clear andconsistent explanations of reduced-form causal effects; the credibilityrevolution in applied econometrics owes at least as much to compellingempirical analyses as to methodological insights.

我还提出两个更广泛的观点:工具变量排除限制正式承诺对简化形式因果关系的清晰和一致解释；应用计量经济学的可信性革命至少要归功于令人信服的实证分析，而不是方法论上的洞见。

2 Causality in Econometrics: Choice vs Chance计量经济学中的因果关系：选择与机会

Guido W. Imbens

Abstract ：This essaydescribes the evolution and recent convergence of two methodological approachesto causal inference.

这篇文章描述了两种因果推断方法的演变和最近的趋同。

The first one,in statistics, started with the analysis and design of randomized experiments.

第一种，在统计学中，从随机实验的分析和设计开始。

The second, ineconometrics, focused on settings with economic agents making optimal choices.

第二种，在计量经济学中，关注经济主体做出最佳选择的环境。

I argue that thelocal average treatment effects framework facilitated the recent convergence bymaking key assumptions transparent and intelligible to scholars in many fields.

我认为，局部平均治疗效果框架通过使许多领域的学者能够透明和理解关键假设，促进了最近的趋同。

Looking ahead, Idiscuss recent developments in causal inference that combine the sametransparency and relevance.

展望未来，我将讨论因果推断的最新发展，这些发展结合了相同的透明度和相关性。

3 Robust Empirical Bayes Confidence Intervals稳健的经验贝叶斯置信区间

Timothy B. Armstrong, Michal Kolesár, Mikkel Plagborg-Møller

Abstract： We construct robustempirical Bayes confidence intervals (EBCIs) in a normal means problem.

我们在正态均值问题中构建了稳健的经验贝叶斯置信区间（EBCI）。

The intervalsare centered at the usual linear empirical Bayes estimator, but use a criticalvalue accounting for shrinkage.

置信区间通常以线性经验贝叶斯估计器为中心，但使用考虑收缩的临界值。

Parametric EBCIsthat assume a normal distribution for the means (Morris (1983b)) maysubstantially undercover when this assumption is violated.

假设均值呈正态分布的参数EBCI（Morris （1983b））在违反此假设时可能会大量隐藏。

In contrast, ourEBCIs control coverage regardless of the means distribution, while remainingclose in length to the parametric EBCIs when the means are indeed Gaussian.

相比之下，无论均值分布如何，我们的EBCI都控制覆盖范围，同时当均值确实是高斯时，其长度与参数EBCI保持接近。

If the means aretreated as fixed, our EBCIs have an average coverage guarantee: the coverageprobability is at least 1 − α on average across the n EBCIs for each of themeans.  

如果均值被视为固定值，则我们的EBCI具有平均覆盖保证：每个均值的n个EBCI的覆盖概率平均至少为1 − α。

Our empiricalapplication considers the effects of U.S. neighborhoods on intergenerationalmobility.

我们的实证应用考虑了美国社区对代际流动性的影响。

4.General Equilibrium Effects of Cash Transfers:Experimental Evidence From Kenya

现金转移支付的一般均衡效应——来自肯尼亚的实验证据

Dennis Egger, Johannes Haushofer, Edward Miguel, Paul Niehaus,Michael Walker

Abstract ：How largeeconomic stimuli generate individual and aggregate responses is a centralquestion in economics, but has not been studied experimentally.

大规模的经济刺激如何产生个体和总体反应是经济学的核心问题，但尚未进行实验研究。We provided one-time cash transfers of about USD 1000 to over 10,500poor households across 653 randomized villages in rural Kenya.

我们向肯尼亚农村653个随机村庄的10500多个贫困家庭提供了约1000美元的一次性现金转移支付。

The impliedfiscal shock was over 15 percent of local GDP.

隐含的财政冲击超过当地GDP的15%。

We find largeimpacts on consumption and assets for recipients.

我们发现对接受者的消费和资产有很大的影响。

Importantly, wedocument large positive spillovers on non-recipient households and firms, andminimal price inflation.

重要的是，我们记录了对非受援家庭和企业的巨大正溢出效应，以及最低的价格通胀。

We estimate alocal transfer multiplier of 2.5. We interpret welfare implications through thelens of a simple household optimization framework.

我们估计本地转移乘数为2.5。我们通过简单的家庭优化框架来解释福利影响。

5.Uneven Growth: Automation's Impact on Income and WealthInequality

增长不平衡：自动化对收入和财富不平等的影响

Benjamin Moll, Lukasz Rachel, Pascual Restrepo

Abstract ：The benefits ofnew technologies accrue not only to high‐skilled labor but also to owners ofcapital in the form of higher capital incomes. This increases inequality. Tomake this argument, we develop a tractable theory that links technology to thedistribution of income and wealth—and not just that of wages—and use it tostudy the distributional effects of automation. We isolate a new theoreticalmechanism: automation increases inequality by raising returns to wealth. Theflip side of such return movements is that automation can lead to stagnantwages and, therefore, stagnant incomes at the bottom of the distribution. Weuse a multiasset model extension to confront differing empirical trends inreturns to productive and safe assets and show that the relevant returnmeasures have increased over time. Automation can account for part of theobserved trends in income and wealth inequality.

摘要：新技术的好处不仅惠及高技能劳动力，也惠及资本所有者，其资本收入较高。这加剧了不平等。为了证明这一论点，我们开发了一种易于处理的理论模型，将技术与收入和财富的分配联系起来，而不仅仅是工资的分配，并用它来研究自动化的分配效应。我们分离出一种新的理论机制：自动化通过提高财富回报来增加不平等。这种回报路径的另一面是，自动化可能导致工资停滞不前，从而导致分配底部的收入停滞不前。我们使用多资产模型扩展来面对生产性和安全资产回报的不同经验趋势，并表明相关的回报措施随着时间的推移而增加。自动化可以解释观察到的收入和财富不平等趋势的一部分。

6.Multinationals, Monopsony, and Local Development:Evidence From the United Fruit Company跨国公司、垄断和地方发展：来自联合水果公司的证据

Esteban Méndez, Diana Van Patten

Abstract This paper studies the role of private sector companies in thedevelopment of local amenities. We use evidence from one of the largestmultinationals of the 20th century: the United Fruit Company (UFCo). The firmwas given a large land concession in Costa Rica—one of the so-called “BananaRepublics”—from 1899 to 1984. Using administrative census data withcensus-block geo-references from 1973 to 2011, we implement a geographicregression discontinuity design that exploits a land assignment that isorthogonal to our outcomes of interest. We find that the firm had a positiveand persistent effect on living standards. Company documents explain that a keyconcern at the time was to attract and maintain a sizable workforce, whichinduced the firm to invest heavily in local amenities—like the development ofeducation and health infrastructure—that can account for our result. Consistentwith this mechanism, we show, empirically and through a proposed model, thatthe firm's investment efforts increase with worker mobility.

本文研究了私营部门公司在当地基础设施开发中的作用。我们使用20世纪最大的跨国公司之一：联合水果公司（UFCo）的证据。从1899年到1984年，该公司在哥斯达黎加（所谓的“香蕉共和国”之一）获得了大量土地特许权。使用1973年至2011年的人口普查区块地理参考的行政人口普查数据，我们实现了地理回归不连续性设计，该设计利用了与我们感兴趣的结果正交的土地分配。我们发现该公司对生活水平产生了积极而持久的影响。公司文件解释说，当时的一个关键问题是吸引和维持大量的劳动力，这促使公司大力投资当地的便利设施 - 如教育和卫生基础设施的发展 - 这可以解释我们的结果。与这一机制一致，我们通过经验并通过提出的模型表明，公司的投资努力随着工人的流动性而增加。

7.Market Competition and Political Influence: AnIntegrated Approach市场竞争与政治影响：一个综合方法

Steven Callander, Dana Foarta, Takuo Sugaya

Abstract The operation of markets and of politics are in practicedeeply intertwined. Political decisions set the rules of the game for marketcompetition and, conversely, market competitors participate in and influencepolitical decisions. We develop an integrated model to capture the circularitybetween the two domains. We show that a positive feedback loop emerges suchthat market power begets political power, and political power begets marketpower, but that this feedback loop is bounded. With too much market power, thebalance between politics and markets itself becomes lopsided and this drives awedge between the interests of a policymaker and the dominant firm. Althoughsuch a wedge would seem pro-competitive, we show how it can exacerbate thestatic and dynamic inefficiency of market outcomes. More generally, our modeldemonstrates that intuitions about market competition can be upended whencompetition is intermediated by a strategic policymaker.

市场与政治的运行在实践中是紧密交织在一起的。政治决策为市场竞争制定了游戏规则，相反，市场竞争者参与并影响政治决策。我们开发了一个集成模型来捕捉两个领域之间的循环性。结果表明，出现了一个正反馈循环，使得市场力量产生政治权力，政治权力产生市场力量，但这个反馈循环是有界的。由于市场力量过大，政治和市场之间的平衡本身就会变得不平衡，这在政策制定者和占主导地位的公司的利益之间造成了楔子。

gzh：理想主义的百年孤独